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In this dissertation, two main contributions are given as;
(i) Performance improvement of FrodoKEM using Gray and error-correcting codes
(ECCs).
(ii) Optimal minimax polynomial approximation of sign function by composite poly-
nomial for homomorphic comparison.
First, modification of FrodoKEM using Gray codes and ECCs is studied. Lattice-
based scheme is one of the most promising schemes for post-quantum cryptography
(PQC). Among many lattice-based cryptosystems, FrodoKEM is a well-known key-
encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on (plain) learning with errors problems and
is advantageous in that the hardness is based on the problem of unstructured lattices.
Many lattice-based cryptosystems adopt ECCs to improve their performance, such as
LAC, Three Bears, and Round5 which were presented in the NIST PQC Standard-
ization Round 2 conference. However, for lattice-based cryptosystems that do not use
ring structures such as FrodoKEM, it is difficult to use ECCs because the number of
transmitted symbols is small. In this dissertation, I propose a method to apply Gray
and ECCs to FrodoKEM by encoding the bits converted from the encrypted symbols.
It is shown that the proposed method improves the security level and/or the bandwidth
of FrodoKEM, and 192 message bits, 50% more than the original 128 bits, can be
transmitted using one of the modified Frodo-640’s.
Second, an optimal minimax polynomial approximation of sign function by a com-
posite polynomial is studied. The comparison function of the two numbers is one of
the most commonly used operations in many applications including deep learning and
data processing systems. Several studies have been conducted to efficiently evaluate
the comparison function in homomorphic encryption schemes which only allow ad-
i
dition and multiplication for the ciphertext. Recently, new comparison methods that
approximate sign function using composite polynomial in the homomorphic encryp-
tion, called homomorphic comparison operation, were proposed and it was proved that
the methods have optimal asymptotic complexity. In this dissertation, I propose new
optimal algorithms that approximate the sign function in the homomorphic encryption
by using composite polynomials of the minimax approximate polynomials, which are
constructed by the modified Remez algorithm. It is proved that the number of required
non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption for the proposed algorithms are less
than those for any methods that use a composite polynomial of component polynomi-
als with odd degree terms approximating the sign function, respectively. In addition,
an optimal polynomial-time algorithm for the proposed homomorphic comparison op-
eration is proposed by using dynamic programming. As a result of numerical analysis,
for the case that I want to minimize the number of non-scalar multiplications, the pro-
posed algorithm reduces the required number of non-scalar multiplications and depth
consumption by about 33% and 35%, respectively, compared to those for the previous
work. In addition, for the case that I want to minimize the depth consumption, the pro-
posed algorithm reduces the required number of non-scalar multiplications and depth
consumption by about 10% and 47%, respectively, compared to those for the previous
work.
keywords: Error-correcting codes, FrodoKEM, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE),
Gray code, homomorphic comparison operation, lattice-based cryptography, minimax
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Existing public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography can
be broken by future quantum computers because of the rapid development of quantum
computers. In addition, quantum computers can perform an exhaustive search in the
square root of time complexity of classical computers, and the key length of symmetric
ciphers such as advanced encryption standard (AES) should be doubled for the same
security level. Therefore, it is very important to develop secure post-quantum cryptog-
raphy (PQC) algorithms resistant to quantum computing. In the first-round evaluation
of PQC schemes submitted to NIST PQC Standardization (i.e., NIST PQC Round
1), 26 algorithms have been selected for NIST PQC Round 2 and are under evalu-
ation. Among the algorithms selected for NIST PQC Round 2 are the lattice-based
schemes, code-based schemes, multi-variate schemes, and so on. Notably, 12 of the 26
algorithms are lattice-based ones [1]–[3]. Thus, lattice-based cryptography is the most
promising field for PQC [4, 5].
Learning with errors (LWE) is a problem that was first introduced in [6] and it
is proved that LWE is more difficult to solve than some well-known mathematical
problems on lattices. Cryptosystems such as Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms are
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based on the hardness of integer factorization problem or discrete logarithm problem.
However, Shor proposed an efficient quantum algorithm on a quantum computer to
solve these problems [7]. On the other hand, efficient quantum algorithms that solve
LWE have not been found yet. Thus, there are many proposed PQC schemes based
on LWE. FrodoKEM is a lattice-based algorithm based on the hardness of LWE, and
FrodoKEM is one of the representative lattice-based PQC schemes selected for the
NIST PQC Round 2 [1].
In addition, a lot of research has been done on applying error-correcting codes
(ECCs) to lattice-based PQC schemes to improve their performance. NewHope,
Round5, LAC, and Three Bears are lattice-based schemes selected for NIST PQC
Round 2 that use ECCs. NewHope [2] uses a simple error correction technique, called
additive threshold encoding (ATE). Round5 [8], which is a combined algorithm of
Hila5 [9] and Round2 [10], uses an ECC, called XE5 which is resistant to side-channel
attacks. LAC [11, 12] uses BCH codes of large code lengths. Three Bears [13] uses
BCH codes such that constant-time implementation is possible, but the performance
of BCH codes used in Three Bears is relatively worse compared to the performance
of BCH codes used in LAC. A lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM)
scheme called KCL [14], which was submitted to NIST PQC Round 1 but was not se-
lected for NIST PQC Round 2, uses a single-error correcting code, lattice code in D̃4
[15], or lattice code in E8 [14]. In [16], the performance of NewHope was improved
by using ECCs. The ATE technique used in NewHope is replaced by BCH codes or
concatenated coding schemes of low-density parity check (LDPC) and BCH codes to
improve the security level. However, for lattice-based cryptosystems that do not use
ring structures such as FrodoKEM, it is difficult to use ECCs because the number of
transmitted symbols is small.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a cryptographic system that allows an untrusted
worker to perform algebraic operations over the encrypted data without learning any-
thing about the data [17]. Figure 1.1 shows the description of HE. Due to this feature,
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HE has been extensively studied and has attracted significant attention in various ap-
plications such as deep learning, medical data processing, etc. Until Gentry’s seminal
work [18] in 2009, HE schemes were able to perform only a few specific operations for
the encrypted data. A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme which allows ar-
bitrary computations on the encrypted data was first developed in [18] and many FHE
schemes have since been proposed to increase the efficiency of homomorphic compu-
tation [19]–[22]. Recently, Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) and the fast fully homo-
morphic encryption over the torus (TFHE) are known as two typical FHE schemes.
Since FHE only provides addition and multiplication, it is usually difficult to per-
form non-polynomial operations. Among non-polynomial operations, the comparison
operation is one of the most commonly used operations in actual applications, along
with addition and multiplication. Therefore, some studies on homomorphic compari-
son operation have been done [23]. Recently, a method of performing the homomor-
phic comparison operation with optimal asymptotic complexity using composite poly-
nomial has been studied [24].
Figure 1.1: Description of homomorphic encryption.
1.2 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows.
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In Chapter 2, some preliminaries are presented. In Section 2.1, the NIST PQC stan-
dardization process is introduced and public-key encryption (PKE) and KEM schemes
are described in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, lattice-based cryptography is introduced,
and BCH and Gray codes are described in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, FHE is described
and in Section 2.6, the concepts of approximation theory are introduced. Finally, algo-
rithms for minimax approximation are described in Section 2.7.
In Chapter 3, modifying FrodoKEM with Gray codes and ECCs is proposed. In
Section 3.1, FrodoPKE is described as a digital communication system and the method
of modification of FrodoKEM with Gray codes and ECCs is proposed. In addition,
ECCs and Gray codes to be used for FrodoPKE are designed and the method of calcu-
lating DFR is introduced. In Section 3.2, the results of the improvement of FrodoKEM
by using Gray codes and ECCs are presented. First, the security level is improved
by increasing the standard deviation of error. Second, the message size is increased.
Finally, the bandwidth is reduced by decreasing the modulus.
In Chapter 4, applying a composition of minimax approximate polynomials for
homomorphic comparison operation is proposed. Introduction is given in Section 4.1.
In Section 4.2, a new method to approximate sign function using composite polyno-
mial of minimax approximate polynomials is proposed. In addition, it is proved that
the composite polynomials of minimax approximate polynomials obtained from the
proposed method are optimal with respect to non-scalar multiplications or depth con-
sumption among all the composite polynomial of polynomials with odd degree terms.
Finally, achieving a polynomial-time algorithm for the homomorphic comparison by
using dynamic programming is described. In Section 4.3, the numerical results of the
improved homomorphic comparison operation by using the proposed algorithms are
presented for both when the number of non-scalar multiplications is minimized and
when the depth consumption is minimized. The required number of non-scalar multi-
plications and depths for the proposed algorithms are compared to those for the previ-
ous algorithm.
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Finally, the concluding remarks are given in Chapter 5.
1.3 Notations
The following notations are used in this dissertation.
• For a finite set S, the uniform distribution on S is denoted by U(S).
• For a probability distribution χ, drawing e value according to χ is denoted as
e← χ.
• The ring of integers is denoted by Z, and for a positive integer q, the quotient
ring of integers modulo q is denoted by Zq = Z/qZ.




In this chapter, some preliminaries are introduced. First, NIST PQC standardization is
introduced. Second, the basic concepts of PKE and KEM schemes are given. Third,
lattice-based cryptography is described. Fourth, the basic concepts of BCH and Gray
codes are given. Fifth, the basic concept of FHE and comparison operation in FHE are
introduced. Finally, the concepts of approximation theory and some algorithms that
obtain the minimax approximate polynomials are given.
2.1 NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization
2.1.1 Background
Recently, a lot of research has been conducted on quantum computers. Quantum com-
puters are machines that use quantum phenomena to solve mathematical problems that
classical computers cannot solve. If large-scale quantum computers are developed,
many commercial cryptographic systems will be broken. In particular, many public-
key cryptographic systems such as RSA, elliptic curve cryptosystems, and digital sig-
nature algorithms, which are used for key establishment protocol and digital signa-
tures, will be completely broken. With these concerns, many researchers have begun
to study PQC schemes. The goal is to develop a secure cryptographic system against
6
quantum and classical computers. Developed PQC schemes will be replacements for
commercial public-key cryptographic systems when large-scale quantum computers
are developed.
There are several PQC schemes. Most of them are lattice-based cryptosystems,
code-based cryptosystems, multi-variate cryptosystems, and hash signature system.
However, more research is needed to gain more confidence in the security and to im-
prove performance. Thus, NIST decided to start developing PQC standard for the fol-
lowing two reasons:
(i) There has been considerable progress in quantum computer research.
(ii) The transition to PQC seems to be very difficult. Significant efforts will be
needed for developing, standardizing, and deploying new PQC cryptosystems.
In addition, this transition should be done long before the development of large-
scale quantum computers.
Several rounds are expected to take place for 3 to 5 years. The goal of the standard-
ization process is to select many acceptable candidate algorithms. NIST expects that
this evaluation process will be much more complex than the standardization processes
of SHA-3 or AES. This is because public-key cryptosystems are more complicated
than hash functions or block ciphers, and the current understanding of quantum com-
puters is low.
2.1.2 Categories for Security Level
There is significant uncertainty in the PQC standardization process since it is difficult
to predict the performance of quantum algorithms in the future. Thus, NIST defines a
broad set of security categories from Category 1 to Category 5. Since, PKE and KEM
schemes are only related to security categories 1, 3, and 5, only the security categories
1, 3, and 5 are introduced below. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the security categories and
the required circuit sizes to break AES.
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Table 2.1: NIST security categories.
security description
I At least as hard to break as AES128 (exhaustive key search)
III At least as hard to break as AES192 (exhaustive key search)
V At least as hard to break as AES256 (exhaustive key search)
Table 2.2: Required circuit sizes to break AES.
security description
AES 128 2170 quantum gates or 2143 classical gates
AES 192 2233 quantum gates or 2207 classical gates
AES 256 2298 quantum gates or 2272 classical gates
2.1.3 List of Algorithms in NIST PQC Round 2
A total of 69 PQC algorithms were submitted to NIST PQC Round 1. The 26 algo-
rithms among the 69 algorithms were selected for NIST PQC Round 2. Several kinds
of PQC schemes such as lattice-based schemes, code-based schemes, multi-variate
schemes, hash-based schemes, and an isogeny scheme were selected for NIST PQC
Round 2. Among them, the 12 algorithms are lattice-based schemes. Thus, it can be
seen that the most promising PQC is lattice-based cryptography. Table 2.3 shows the
algorithms selected for NIST PQC Round 2.
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Table 2.3: PQC algorithms accepted for NIST PQC Round 2.

























2.2 Public-Key Encryption and Key-Encapsulation Mecha-
nism
PKE and KEM schemes are defined as follows. Figure 2.1 shows the description of a
PKE scheme.
Definition 2.1. A PKE scheme is a tuple of three polynomial-time algorithms that
satisfy the followings:
• KeyGen(λ)→ (pk, sk); KeyGen takes security parameter λ as an input and
outputs public key pk and secret key sk.
• Enc(µ, pk) → ct; Enc takes a public key pk and a message µ as inputs, and
outputs a ciphertext ct of µ.
• Dec(ct, sk)→ µ′ or ⊥; Dec takes a ciphertext ct and a secret key sk as inputs,
and output a message µ′. If the decryption procedure fails,Dec outputs a special
symbol ⊥.
Figure 2.1: Description of a public-key encryption scheme.
Definition 2.2. A KEM scheme is a tuple of three polynomial-time algorithms that
satisfy the followings:
• KeyGen(λ)→ (pk, sk); KeyGen takes security parameter λ as an input and
outputs public key pk and secret key sk.
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• Encaps(pk) → (ct, ss); Encaps takes a public key pk and outputs an encap-
sulation ct and shared secret ss.
• Decaps(ct, sk) → ss′; Decaps takes an encapsulation ct and a secret key sk
as inputs, and outputs a shared secret ss′.
Security notions of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA)
and indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) are now defined
as follows.
Definition 2.3. The chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) indistinguishability experiment
PubKcpaA,Π(n) is defined for PKE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and adversary
A as follows:
(i) KeyGen(λ) obtains (pk, sk).
(ii) Adversary A is given pk as well as oracle access to Enc(·, pk). The adversary
outputs a pair of messages µ0 and µ1 with |µ0| = |µ1|.
(iii) A random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen, and the ciphertext ct ← Enc(µb, pk) is
computed and given to A. ct is called the challenge ciphertext. A continues to
have access to Enc(·, pk).
(iv) A outputs a bit b′.
(v) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.4. PKE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA-secure if, for all
probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl
such that





Definition 2.5. The chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) indistinguishability experiment
PubKccaA,Π(n) is defined for PKE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) and adversary
A as follows:
(i) KeyGen(λ) obtains (pk, sk).
(ii) Adversary A is given pk and access to a decryption oracle Dec(·, sk). The
adversary outputs a pair of messages µ0 and µ1 with |µ0| = |µ1|.
(iii) A random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen, and the ciphertext ct ← Enc(µb, pk) is
computed and given to A.
(iv) A continues to have access to the decryption oracle but can not request decryp-
tion of ct itself.
(v) Finally, A outputs a bit b′.
(vi) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.6. PKE scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA-secure if, for all
probabilistic, polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl
such that




In [25], it is shown that an IND-CCA-secure KEM can be constructed from an




2.3.1 Learning with Errors Problem
LWE problem was first introduced in [6]. χ is usually a discrete Gaussian of width αq
for some 0 < α < 1. The definitions of LWE distribution, search-LWE problem, and
decision-LWE problem are as follows.
Definition 2.7. For a vector s ∈ Znq , the LWE distribution As,χ over Znq × Zq is
sampled by choosing a ← U(Znq ), choosing e ← χ, and outputting (a, b = 〈s,a〉 +
e mod q).
Definition 2.8. Search-LWEn,q,χ,m problem is to find secret s form given independent
samples (ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq sampled from As,χ for a uniformly random s ∈ Znq .
Definition 2.9. Decision-LWEn,q,χ,m problem is to distinguish the case (with non-
negligible advantage) for m independent samples (ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq of either: (1)
As,χ for a uniformly random s ∈ Znq , or (2) the uniform distribution.
It is proved that Search-LWE and Decision-LWE are more difficult to solve than
some well-known mathematical problems on lattices such as decisional approximate
shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP).
In addition, efficient quantum algorithms that solve LWE have not been found yet.
Thus, there are many PQC schemes based on LWE, which can be represented using a
matrix as
bt = stA + et (mod q).
The columns of A ∈ Zn×mq are the vectors ai ∈ Znq , the entries of the vector b are
bi ∈ Zq, and e is sampled from χm.
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2.3.2 Overview of FrodoPKE Algorithm
FrodoKEM is one of the representative PQC cryptosystems that use LWE problem.
This section reviews FrodoPKE, which is the underlying algorithm of FrodoKEM.
FrodoKEM is the QFO transformation of FrodoPKE, and the decryption failure rate
(DFR) performance of FrodoKEM is the same as that of FrodoPKE [1]. For simplicity,
I apply ECCs to FrodoPKE instead of FrodoKEM. In FrodoKEM schemes submitted
to PQC Round 1, there are two kinds of FrodoKEM schemes: Frodo-640 for security
category 1 and Frodo-976 for security category 3. Another scheme, Frodo-1344, was
also proposed for security category 5 in FrodoKEM schemes submitted to PQC Round
2. In this dissertation, I focus only on Frodo-640 and Frodo-976. These algorithms
have the same form but use different parameters. The algorithms of FrodoPKE are
described with the following parameters:
• χ; a probability distribution of approximated rounded Gaussian distribution with
small support set defined on the set of integers, Z
• q; a power-of-two integer modulus
• m̄, n̄, n; dimensions of matrices
• B; the number of bits per each symbol, where bits mean the codeword bits if
ECC is used and the message bits, otherwise
• lenA; the length of seeds for pseudorandom matrix generation for public key
• lenE; the length of seeds for pseudorandom bit generation for error sampling
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Algorithm 1: FrodoPKE.KeyGen [1]
Input: None
Output: Key pair (pk, sk) ∈ ({0, 1}lenA × Zn×n̄q )× Zn×n̄q
1 seedA ← U({0, 1}lenA);
2 Generate pseudorandom matrix A ∈ Zn×nq with seedA for public key;
3 seedE ← U({0, 1}lenE) for generation of error matrix E ;
4 Generate matrices S,E ∈ Zn×n̄q from seedE according to χ distribution;
5 Compute B = AS + E;
6 Return public key pk ← (seedA,B) and secret key sk ← S;
Algorithm 2: FrodoPKE.Enc [1]
Input: Message µ ∈ {0, 1}m̄n̄B and public key
pk = (seedA,B) ∈ {0, 1}lenA × Zn×n̄q
Output: Ciphertext ct = (C1,C2) ∈ Zm̄×nq × Zm̄×n̄q
1 Generate pseudorandom matrix A ∈ Zn×nq with seedA;
2 seedE ← U({0, 1}lenE);
3 Generate error matrices S′,E′ ∈ Zm̄×nq and E′′ ∈ Zm̄×n̄q from seedE
according to χ distribution;
4 Compute B′ = S′A + E′ and V = S′B + E′′;
5 Return ciphertext ct← (C1,C2) = (B′,V + Frodo.Encode(µ))
Algorithm 3: FrodoPKE.Dec [1]
Input: C1,C2,S
Output: µ′
1 Compute M = C2 −C1S = V + Frodo.Encode(µ)− (S′A + E′)S =
Frodo.Encode(µ) + S′E + E′′ −E′S = Frodo.Encode(µ) + E′′′;
2 Return µ′ ← Frodo.Decode(M);
Bob generates a public key and a secret key through Algorithm 1 and sends the
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public key to Alice. Alice generates ciphertexts C1 and C2 through Algorithm 2 with
the received public key and the message µ and then sends them to Bob. Finally, Bob
computes M = C2 −C1S and restores the message µ sent by Alice as in Algorithm
3.
The Frodo.Encode function in Algorithm 2 is defined as follows. Frodo.Encode
takes a message µ ∈ Zm̄n̄B as input and outputs a matrix in Zm̄×n̄q . In Frodo-640 and
Frodo-976, the values of B are 2 and 3, respectively, and B-bit messages are encoded
into symbols in Zq according to the following rules:
• B = 2 without Gray coding;







• B = 3 without Gray coding;
















The Frodo.Decode function in Algorithm 3 is defined as follows. In Frodo-640
and Frodo-976, Bob rounds each component of the matrix M to the nearest multiples
of q/4 or q/8, respectively. Then, Bob obtains the message µ′ by applying the inverse
of mapping in (2.1) or (2.2) to each rounded symbol in Zq.
Table 2.4: Initial error distributions χ in FrodoPKE [1].














































The initial error distributions χ of FrodoPKE are shown in Table 2.4 and are
derived according to the following procedure. First, a Gaussian distribution is ob-
tained with a given standard deviation σ. Next, a rounded Gaussian distribution is
derived from it. Finally, the error distribution of the small support that approximates
the rounded Gaussian distribution is obtained [1].
Let ψ be the product distribution of the two initial error distributions. Let χ′ be the
error distribution obtained by convolving ψ 2n times and then convolving the resulting
distribution with χ. Each component of E′′′ in Algorithm 3 follows the distribution χ′,
and the standard deviation of χ′ is approximately σ′ ≈ σ
√
2nσ2 + 1.
2.3.3 Parameters of FrodoKEM
Table 2.5: Parameter sets of FrodoKEM [1].
n q σ B m̄× n̄ DFR ct size (bytes)
Frodo-640 640 215 2.75 2 8× 8 2−148.8 9736
Frodo-976 976 216 2.3 3 8× 8 2−199.6 15768
Important FrodoKEM parameters are given in Table 2.5. Frodo-640 and Frodo-976
satisfy security categories 1 and 3 in the NIST PQC Standardization, respectively. How
to compute the security level of FrodoKEM is described in [1]. In this dissertation,
the FrodoKEM python source code supported by submitters of FrodoKEM is used to
calculate the security level of various cases. Actually, the security level of the actual
FrodoKEM is derived from a series of reductions, which is 5 or 6 bits smaller than the
security level computed by the source code supported by submitters of FrodoKEM.
Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to use this source code because my goal is not to
obtain the accurate security level but to show improvement by using ECCs.
FrodoKEM has various parameters, n, q, σ,B, m̄, and n̄, which determine the
bandwidth, computational complexity, the security level, and the DFR, respectively.
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To satisfy security categories 1 and 3, it is recommended to set the security level higher
than 143 and 207 bits, respectively. In addition, because there is an attack method by
using decryption failure [26], the DFR should be low. Therefore, it is desirable that the
DFRs are less than about 2−148 and 2−199 for security categories 1 and 3, respectively.
2.4 BCH and Gray Codes
BCH codes were developed in 1960 [27]. These codes can correct multiple errors
and exhibit good error correction performance even for small code length. Relatively
simple and feasible encoding and decoding techniques are also known, and hence,
BCH codes have been widely used.
The code length of the BCH code is n = qm − 1 for some prime q, and q = 2
holds for binary codes. In this dissertation, binary BCH codes are used. BCH codes
are usually denoted by (ln, lk, lt), where ln is the length of codeword, lk is the length
of message, and lt is the error-correction capability, i.e., the maximum number of
correctable errors.
The Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler decoding algorithm [28] has long been known
for efficient decoding, and its complexity is O(lnlt). BCH decoding algorithms do
not usually have a constant computation time. However, using the method given in
[29], constant-time decoding of the BCH code can be implemented to defend some
side-channel attacks.
Gray code is a code designed to change only one binary bit for the adjacent sym-
bols. The most commonly used binary Gray code is the reflected binary Gray code and
it is also used in this dissertation. Gray code is used a lot in wireless communication
systems. For higher-order modulations such as pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) or
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), Gray code is used to lower bit error proba-
bility. Table 2.6 shows an example of a typical Gray code for 4 bits.
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Table 2.6: An example of Gray code for 4 bits.


















2.5 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
2.5.1 Homomorphic Encryption
In the IoT era, a lot of devices communicate over the Internet. A third party will in-
evitably be asked to process the data because many devices cannot process data on
their own. However, if the data to be processed is confidential and the third party is
unreliable, the data should be sent encrypted, and the third party should perform op-
erations on the encrypted data. HE allows operations over the encrypted data without
decryption for this case.
Until Gentry’s seminal work [18] in 2009, HE schemes were able to perform only a
few specific operations on the encrypted data. FHE is a cryptosystem that can perform
infinite number of algebraic operations on the encrypted data with bootstrapping. A
FHE scheme was first developed in [18] and many FHE schemes have since been
proposed to improve efficiency [20, 21, 22]. From now on, I will consider only the
FHE rather than the HE.
FHE schemes are classified as bit-wise FHE and word-wise FHE. The basic op-
erations of bit-wise FHE are logic gates, and the basic operations of word-wise FHE
are algebraic operations such as addition and multiplication. In this dissertation, I fo-
cus only on word-wise FHE and thus the FHE is used instead of word-wise FHE. The
definition of FHE is given as follows.
Definition 2.10. A FHE scheme E is a set of five polynomial-time algorithms that
satisfy the followings:
• KeyGen(λ) → (pk, sk); KeyGen takes security parameter λ as an input and
outputs public key pk and secret key sk.
• Enc(µ, pk) → ct; Enc takes a public key pk and a message µ as inputs, and
outputs a ciphertext ct of µ.
• Dec(ct, sk) → µ′ or ⊥; Dec takes a ciphertext ct and a secret key sk as in-
puts, and outputs a message µ′. If the decryption procedure fails, Dec outputs a
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special symbol ⊥.
• Add(ct1, ct2, evk); Add takes ciphertexts ct1 and ct2 of µ1 and µ2, respectively,
and an evaluation key evk as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext ctadd of µ1 + µ2.
• Mult(ct1, ct2, evk); Mult takes ciphertexts ct1 and ct2 of µ1 and µ2, respec-
tively, and an evaluation key evk as inputs, and outputs a ciphertext ctmult of
µ1 · µ2.
In CKKS scheme, there are two kinds of multiplications: scalar multiplication
and non-scalar multiplication. Non-scalar multiplications require much more compu-
tational complexity than scalar multiplications. Thus, in this dissertation, when the
homomorphic comparison operation is considered, I focus on reducing the number of
non-scalar multiplications rather than scalar multiplications, together with depth con-
sumption.
2.5.2 Comparison Operation in Fully Homomorphic Encryption
FHEs support addition and multiplication operations on the encrypted data, but do
not support any non-arithmetic operations such as comparison operation. Thus, the
approximation of comparison operation should be performed by using addition and




1 if a > b
1/2 if a = b
0 if a < b
, sgn(x) =

1 if x > 0
0 if x = 0 .
−1 if x < 0
My goal is to perform approximation for comp(a, b), which is implemented only
with additions and multiplications. Note that comp(a, b) and sgn(x) functions have
the following relationships as
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sgn(x) = 2comp(x, 0)− 1, comp(a, b) = sgn(a− b) + 1
2
.
Thus, the approximation of comp(a, b) is equivalent to that of sgn(x). Therefore,
I only focus on the polynomial approximation for sgn(x).
Even though the efficiency of FHEs has been improved a lot since the first FHE
was developed in 2009, it is known that the non-scalar multiplication operation still
takes a lot of computational complexity. In addition, since bootstrapping requires a lot
of computational complexity, minimizing the depth consumption for the homomorphic
comparison operation is also important, which reduces the number of bootstrappings.
Thus, it is necessary to approximate sgn(x) by polynomials while minimizing the
number of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption.
Definition 2.11 ([24]). For α > 0 and 0 < ε < 1, a polynomial p is said to be
(α, ε)-close to sgn(x) over [−1, 1] if p satisfies the following:
||p(x)− sgn(x)||∞,[−1,−ε]∪[ε,1] ≤ 2−α,
where || · ||∞,D denotes the infinity norm over the domain D.
sgn(x) is discontinuous at x = 0, and thus it is impossible to exactly approximate
sgn(x) near x = 0. Definition 2.11 means that the approximation error is guaranteed
below 2−α only for ε ≤ |x| ≤ 1. Figure 2.2 shows an example of a function satisfying
(α, ε)-close.
2.6 Approximation Theory
In this section, some concepts for approximation theory are introduced.
Definition 2.12. Let D be a closed subset of [a, b]. Let f be a continuous function on
D. A polynomial p is said to be the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most
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Figure 2.2: An example of an approximate polynomial satisfying (α, ε)-close for sign
function.
n on D for f if p minimizes maxD ||p(x) − f(x)||∞ among polynomials of degree at
most n.
It is known that for any continuous function f on D, the minimax approximate
polynomial of degree at most n on D for f uniquely exists [30]. I put f(x) = sgn(x)
since the goal in this dissertation is to approximate sgn(x). I also only deal with cases
where D is the union of two symmetric closed intervals, [−b,−a] ∪ [a, b].
Definition 2.13 (Haar’s Condition and Generalized Polynomial [30]). A set of func-
tions {g1, g2, · · · , gn} satisfies the Haar’s condition if each gi is continuous function
and if the determinant
D[x1, · · · , xn] =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣




g1(xn) · · · gn(xn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is not zero for any n distinct points x1, · · · , xn. A linear combination of {g1, · · · , gn}
is referred to as a generalized polynomial.
The following theorem and lemmas are needed for some proofs in Chapter 4.
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Theorem 2.1 (Chebyshev Alternation Theorem [30]). Let D be a closed subset of
[a, b]. Let {g1, g2, · · · , gn} be a set of continuous functions on [a, b] which satisfies the
Haar’s condition. A polynomial p =
∑
i cigi is the minimax approximate polynomial
on D to any given continuous function f on D if and only if there are n+ 1 elements
x0 < · · · < xn in D such that r(xi) = −r(xi−1) = ±||r||∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ n for the error
function r = f − p.
Remark 1. Let D be [−b,−a] ∪ [a, b]. Since r(xi) = ±||r||∞ for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, r(x)
should have extreme points at xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, it holds that p′(xi) = 0 and
xi ∈ (−b,−a) ∪ (a, b), or xi ∈ {−b,−a, a, b}.
Lemma 2.1 (Generalized de La Vallee Poussin Theorem [31]). Let {g1, g2, · · · , gn}
be a set of continuous functions on [a, b] that satisfies the Haar’s condition. Let D be
a closed subset of [a, b] and let f(x) be a continuous function on D. Let xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n
be n+1 consecutive points onD. Let p(x) be a generalized polynomial such that p−f
has alternately positive and negative values at xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Let p∗(x) be a minimax
approximate polynomial on D for f and let e(f) be the minimax approximaton error




Lemma 2.2 ([32]). If f(x) is an odd function, the minimax approximate polynomial
of degree at most n to f(x) is also odd function.
2.7 Algorithms for Minimax Approximation
Remez algorithm [33] obtains the minimax approximate polynomials of a continu-
ous function on one interval. It was proved that the Remez can always find the exact
minimax approximate polynomials.
Recently, Lee et al. [31] proposed a modified Remez algorithm which finds the
minimax approximate polynomial on multiple intervals and proved that the algorithm
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can always find the minimax approximate polynomial for any piecewise continuous
function. This modified Remez algorithm is used in this dissertation to find the mini-
max approximate polynomial for the sign function.
Let µ(x) be a function defined as
µ(x) =

1 p(x)− f(x) is a local maximum value at x on D
−1 p(x)− f(x) is a local minimum value at x on D
0 otherwise.
There are three criteria for choosing n+1 extreme points in Algorithm 5 as follows:
(i) Local extreme value condition; min
i
µ(yi)(p(yi)− f(yi)) ≥ E.
(ii) Alternating condition; µ(yi) · µ(yi+1) = −1 for i = 1, · · · , n.
(iii) Maximum absolute sum condition;
n+1∑
i=1
|p(yi)− f(yi)| is maximum for all can-
didate set of extreme points satisfying the local extreme value condition and the
alternating condition.
The modified Remez algorithm operates with n basis functions {g1, g2, · · · , gn}.
Suppose that the minimax approximate polynomial p(x) is represented with the
basis functions as p(x) =
∑n
i=1 cigi(x). The modified Remez algorithm finds
the coefficients ci’s of p(x). The simplest basis functions are a power basis,
{1, x, x2, · · · , xn−1}. However, when approximating the sign function using this ba-
sis, the magnitudes of the coefficients ci’s are unstable such as too small values or too
large values, which makes a lot of numerical errors. Therefore, the Chebyshev poly-
nomials are usually used as the basis functions. The Chebyshev polynomials Ti’s on




Ti(t) = 2tTi−1(t)− Ti−2(t) for i ≥ 2.
If the sign function is approximated on a domain [−b, b] for some b > 1, then
T̃i(t) = Ti(t/b) should be used instead of Ti for all i.
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Algorithm 4: Remez algorithm [31]
Input: Polynomial basis {g1, · · · , gn}, a domain [a, b], an approximation
parameter δ, and a continuous function f on [a, b]
Output: The minimax approximate polynomial p for f
1 Choose x1, · · · , xn+1 ∈ [a, b], where x1 < · · · < xn+1;
2 Find the polynomial p(x) in terms of {g1, · · · , gn} such that
p(xi)− f(xi) = (−1)iE, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 for some E;
3 Divide the domain [a, b] into n+ 1 sections [zi−1, zi], i = 1, · · · , n+ 1.
z1, · · · , zn are zeros of p(x)− f(x), where xi < zi < xi+1, and
z0 = a, zn+1 = b;
4 Find the maximum or minimum point for each section when p(xi)− f(xi)
has positive or negative value, respectively. These points y1, · · · , yn+1 are
called extreme points;
5 εmax ← max
1≤i≤n+1
|p(yi)− f(yi)|;
6 εmin ← min
1≤i≤n+1
|p(yi)− f(yi)|;
7 if (εmax − εmin)/εmin < δ then
8 Return p(x);
9 else
10 Replace xi’s with yi’s. Go to line 2;
11 end
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Algorithm 5: Modified Remez algorithm [31]
Input: A polynomial basis {g1, · · · , gn}, an approximation parameter δ, an
input domain D =
⋃l
i=1[ai, bi] ⊂ R, and a continuous function f on
D
Output: The minimax approximate polynomial p for f
1 Choose x1, · · · , xn+1 ∈ D, where x1 < · · · < xn+1;
2 Find the polynomial p(x) in terms of {g1, · · · , gn} such that
p(xi)− f(xi) = (−1)iE, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 for some E;
3 Collect all the extreme and boundary points such that
µ(x)(p(x)− f(x)) ≥ |E| and put them in a set B;
4 Find n+ 1 extreme points y1 < y2 < · · · < yn+1 in B which satisfy
alternating condition and maximum absolute sum condition;
5 εmax ← max
1≤i≤n+1
|p(yi)− f(yi)|;
6 εmin ← min
1≤i≤n+1
|p(yi)− f(yi)|;
7 if (εmax − εmin)/εmin < δ then
8 Return p(x);
9 else




Improvement of FrodoKEM Using Gray and BCH
Codes
Existing public key cryptosystems such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography can
be broken by future quantum computers because of the rapid development of quantum
computers. Therefore, it is very important to develop secure PQC algorithms resistant
to quantum computing. Currently, NIST is in the process of proposing, evaluating, and
standardizing PQC algorithms. In the NIST PQC Round 1, the 26 algorithms have
been selected for NIST PQC Round 2 and are under evaluation. Notably, 12 of the 26
algorithms are lattice-based ones. Thus, lattice-based cryptography is clearly the most
promising field for PQC [4, 5].
LWE is a problem presented by Regev [6] in 2005 and is reduced to worst-case
problems on lattices. Ring-LWE (RLWE) is a problem presented in [34], where it is
reduced to worst-case problems on ideal lattices. RLWE significantly reduces the key
size of cryptosystems based on LWE. Many lattice-based PKE and KEM schemes
submitted to NIST are based on the hardness of LWE and RLWE.
Among the lattice-based algorithms selected for NIST PQC Round 2, many pro-
posed algorithms use ECCs to improve their performances. NewHope [2] uses a simple
error correction technique ATE. Round5 [8], which is a combined algorithm of Hila5
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[9] and Round2 [10], uses an ECC called XE5 which is resistant to side-channel at-
tacks. LAC [11, 12] uses BCH codes of large code lengths. Three Bears [13] uses BCH
codes such that constant-time implementation is possible, but its performance is rela-
tively worse compared to those of the BCH codes used in LAC. A lattice-based KEM
scheme called KCL [14], which was submitted to NIST PQC Round 1 but was not se-
lected for NIST PQC Round 2, uses a single-error correcting code, lattice code in D̃4
[15], or lattice code in E8 [14]. However, all of these lattice-based algorithms using
ECCs are ring-based schemes, and there is no case of using ECCs for non-ring ones
such as FrodoKEM [1, 35, 36]. Here, I want to emphasize that my research is the first-
ever one to apply and analyze both ECCs and Gray coding to a non-ring lattice-based
KEM, FrodoKEM. In addition, the application of ECCs and Gray coding to non-ring
schemes such as FrodoKEM is not straightforward, and hence, various new ideas have
been applied to the proposed results as explained here.
FrodoKEM is one of the representative PQC schemes selected for the NIST PQC
Round 2. Therefore, improving the performance of FrodoKEM is considerably impor-
tant, and the proposed schemes in this dissertation are possibly applied to other non-
ring schemes. In this dissertation, I aim to improve the performance of FrodoKEM as
follows:
(i) There is a risk that PQC cryptosystems will be broken because of the increasing
computing power in the era of quantum computers. Therefore, I am motivated
to work on how to use ECCs to improve the security level of FrodoKEM so that
FrodoKEM can resist enhanced computing power in the coming future.
(ii) In the IoT era, it is very important for cryptosystems to be able to send multiple
keys simultaneously or to reduce the bandwidth. Therefore, I work on how to use
ECCs to increase the message size so that multiple keys can be simultaneously
sent and to reduce the bandwidth.
In this chapter, how to apply ECCs to FrodoKEM [1] is studied to improve its secu-
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rity level and/or lower its bandwidth. I propose a method to apply ECCs to FrodoKEM
by encoding the bits converted from the encrypted symbols. In addition, the DFR is
reduced using Gray codes as bit-to-symbol mapping. The proposed method has the
advantage of improving performances without modifying the existing framework of
FrodoKEM. Note that the combination of ECCs and Gray coding is widely used in the
field of wireless communication systems to lower the bit error probability in higher-
order modulation such as PAM and QAM [37]. However, although such a combination
has been widely used, I, for the first time, apply it to a lattice-based PKE or KEM
scheme. The symbols of Zq considered in this chapter are similar to those of PAM,
but modulo q operations should be performed after adding errors. It is called modulo
q PAM. In addition, the environment of wireless communication systems is quite dif-
ferent from that of lattice-based PKE / KEM schemes as follows. In the case of PAM
for wireless communications, when an error is added to a symbol with the largest
magnitude, it is saturated rather than changed to another symbol. However, for the
lattice-based PKE / KEM schemes, all the symbols of Zq are computed by modulo q
operations. For example, if an error 1 is added to the largest value q − 1, it becomes
the smallest value 0.
The limited-magnitude error control codes [38] often adopt Gray coding. However,
while the errors in the channel model for those codes are asymmetric and limited in
their magnitude, the errors in the channel model for FrodoKEM are symmetric and not
limited in their magnitude under mod q arithmetic.
In [16], the performance of NewHope was improved by using ECCs. The ATE
technique used in NewHope is replaced by BCH codes or concatenated coding
schemes of low-density parity check (LDPC) and BCH codes to improve the secu-
rity level. However, the application of ECCs to FrodoKEM is quite different from that
in [16] for the following reasons:
(i) The original FrodoKEM does not use ECCs, and thus, ECCs should be carefully
applied to FrodoKEM. To properly apply ECCs to FrodoKEM, it is needed to
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change some parameters of FrodoKEM, and thus, there is no guarantee that
the performance will be improved as much as expected even if ECCs are used.
Its performance can be improved because I carefully select ECCs, change the
parameter values, and use Gray coding with modulo q PAM.
(ii) Unlike the schemes based on ring-LWE such as NewHope, ECCs cannot be eas-
ily applied to non-ring schemes such as FrodoKEM because the number of sym-
bols to which message bits is mapped to be very small. For example, NewHope
and FrodoKEM have 1024 symbols and 64 symbols, respectively. Thus, it is
not easy to design effective ECCs for the small number of message symbols
in FrodoKEM. Furthermore, because multiple bits are mapped to one symbol
in FrodoKEM, an error of one symbol can result in more than one error bit.
It is complicated to calculate the DFR by considering more than one error bit.
However, it is shown that the probability that errors to the non-adjacent symbols
occur is relatively negligible and thus Gray coding is essential. Thus, by apply-
ing the Gray code in the ECCs, one symbol error can be regarded as one error
bit, which makes it possible to calculate the DFR.
(iii) Assume that normal bit-to-symbol mapping is a mapping in which both bit string
and symbol size are in an increasing order. The mappings in (2.1), (2.2), and
(3.5) in this dissertation are normal bit-to-symbol mappings. In contrast, the
Gray mappings in (3.1) and (3.2) are not normal bit-to-symbol mappings. The
bit strings are not in increasing order in these Gray mappings. When using nor-
mal bit-to-symbol mappings without Gray coding, the DFR becomes very high
because more error bits occur with higher probability, and thus, the performance
of FrodoKEM is not improved, as given in the Tables 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5.
I propose and analyze combined schemes of ECCs and Gray coding in a non-
ring scheme, FrodoKEM for the first time; thus, the performance of FrodoKEM is
substantially improved. My contribution can be summarized as follows:
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(i) The security level of FrodoKEM is improved by increasing the standard devia-
tion σ of error distribution. Because the DFR increases as σ increases, the DFR
requirement is satisfied by properly using Gray and BCH codes with modulo q
PAM.
(ii) The number of message bits of Frodo-640 is increased from 128 bits to 192
bits while keeping the required security level. If the number of message bits
increases, σ should be reduced to meet the DFR requirement, which leads to
degradation of the security level. Such security level degradation can be avoided
by properly using Gray and BCH codes with modulo q PAM.
(iii) The bandwidth of FrodoKEM is reduced by using a smaller q. Because the DFR
increases as q decreases, the DFR requirement is satisfied by properly using
Gray and BCH codes with modulo q PAM.
3.1 Modification of FrodoKEM with Gray and Error-
Correcting Codes
3.1.1 Viewing FrodoPKE as a Digital Communication System
To apply ECCs to FrodoPKE and analyze them, it is convenient to understand the
FrodoPKE in terms of digital communication systems, where messages are transmitted
to the receiver via an encoder, modulator, (noisy) channel, demodulator, and decoder.
Figure 3.1 shows the description of Frodo-640 as a digital communication system.
In this model, the sender is Alice and the receiver is Bob. The shared key µ that
Alice wants to send corresponds to the message bits. The mapping of binary bits to
symbols in Zq in FrodoPKE corresponds to modulation. Frodo.Encode function uses
the term ‘encode’, but in fact it corresponds to a modulator in the digital communica-
tion. In this chapter, Frodo.Encode in FrodoPKE is referred to as a modulator.











Figure 3.1: Description of Frodo-640 as a digital communication system.
generate two ciphertexts C1 and C2 and sends them. Bob computes M = C2 −C1S
with the received C1,C2 and the secret key S. As a result, Frodo.Encode(µ) is added
with noise E′′′. This procedure can be seen as Frodo.Encode(µ) passing through a
noisy channel in the digital communication. Here, the noise element of E′′′ follows χ′
described in Section 2.3.2. These noise elements are not i.i.d. However, because exact
analysis is difficult, it is assumed that they are i.i.d.
The Frodo.Decode function works as follows. The Frodo.Decode function cor-
responds to a demodulator in the digital communication. Frodo.Decode(M) rounds
each symbol in Zq of the received matrix with errors to the nearest multiple of q/4 or
q/8 for Frodo-640 and Frodo-976, respectively. Then, the inverse of the mapping in
(2.1) or (2.2) is applied to obtain the estimated bit string µ′.
If ECCs are used in FrodoPKE, encoding is added before modulation, and decod-
ing is added after demodulation. Figure 3.2 shows the application of ECC to Frodo-640
as a digital communication system.
3.1.2 Error-Correcting Codes for FrodoPKE
To meet security categories 1 and 3 in NIST PQC Standardization, the obtained DFR
should be less than 2−128 and 2−192, respectively. Among various ECCs, algebraic
codes are used, especially BCH codes, rather than modern codes such as LDPC codes














Figure 3.2: Description of Frodo-640 with ECC as a digital communication system.
(i) LDPC codes have a serious error floor problem to be used for FrodoKEM. Be-
cause the error floor is reached quickly, the performance of LDPC codes is much
worse than that of the algebraic codes for the region of DFR lower than 2−128.
(ii) For LDPC codes, it is difficult to algebraically calculate the DFR, and thus, the
DFR should be estimated through numerical analysis. However, in FrodoKEM,
the DFR should be less than 2−128 or 2−192, and numerical analysis in this error
range is impossible. They [16] could not calculate the DFR for LDPC code for
this low DFR.
(iii) For the concatenated coding schemes of LDPC and algebraic codes as in [16], it
is needed to know the statistical characteristics of errors remaining after LDPC
decoding to algebraically estimate the DFR. Although it was not clearly stated
in [16], they seem to assume that the errors remaining after LDPC decoding are
statistically independent and uniformly distributed. However, the LDPC decod-
ing errors tend to be bursty, and the analysis of characteristics of LDPC decoding
errors is known to be a hard problem in the field of coding theory. In addition,
the block error rate around 2−128 is the range where numerical analysis is im-
possible.
Thus, in this dissertation, BCH codes are used because they provide various pa-
rameter values. Specifically, binary BCH codes with parameters (192, 128, 8), (256,
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128, 18), (256, 192, 8), and (256, 192, 8) are used. These are modified BCH codes
obtained by shortening [39] or extending [40] the original BCH codes. For a system-
atic BCH code, the error correcting capability lt is not reduced from shortening. With
extension, lt is maintained or increased. Using these properties, these BCH code pa-
rameters are found to be suitable for FrodoKEM. Note that shortening and extending



















Figure 3.3: Frodo-640 with (192, 128, 8) BCH and Gray codes.
It is well known that Gray coding should be used to map binary data to symbols
from large alphabet for better bit error correction performance in digital communi-
cation. For example, consider the case of applying the (192, 128, 8) BCH code to
Frodo-640 as in Figure 3.3. Encoding the 128-bit message µ results in a 192-bit code-
word c. In the modulation with B = 3, each of the three bits in the codeword c is
mapped to a symbol in Zq according to the following Gray coding, which is different
from the mapping in (2.2) as:
• B = 3 with Gray coding;

















Gray coding in (3.1) is depicted in Figure 3.4, where dotted lines denote decision
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boundaries for demodulation. Figure 3.4 shows that the bit difference between adja-
cent symbols is always one bit in Gray coding. The reason for using Gray coding is
to minimize the number of bit errors and increase the error correction probability of
ECCs.
If ECCs are not used, one symbol error immediately causes a decryption failure.
Thus, it is meaningless to minimize the number of bit errors by using Gray coding
for one symbol error. However, when ECCs are used, the total bit errors whose num-
ber does not exceed error correction capacity are correctable. Thus, it is important to

















Figure 3.4: Gray coding for B = 3.
The 192-bit codeword is mapped to 64 symbols in Zq, and errors are added to these
symbols in Zq while passing through the channel. Demodulation rounds each symbol
in Zq to the nearest multiples of q/8 and then applies the inverse of the mapping in
(3.1). Then, c′ is obtained, which is the codeword c added with errors. Then, BCH
decoding is performed to obtain c to estimate µ.
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Gray coding for B = 4 is performed as:
• B = 4 with Gray coding;





















































Figure 3.5: Frodo-640 with (256, 128, 18) BCH and Gray codes.
3.1.4 IND-CCA Security of Modified FrodoKEM
ECCs are applied to FrodoPKE as shown in Figure 3.2. BCH encoder BCH.Encode
is added before Frodo.Encode which corresponds to modulator and BCH decoder
BCH.Decode is added after Frodo.Decode which corresponds to demodulator. Spe-
cific BCH parameters are shown in Section 3.1.2. In addition, Gray coding in (3.1)
or (3.2) is used instead of the existing Frodo.Encode function, and Frodo.Decode
is replaced with another function as shown in Section 3.1.3. Let us call the modified
Frodo.Encode as Frodo.Encode′ and the modified FrodoPKE as FrodoPKE′.
In this dissertation, I describe FrodoPKE′ and analyze the performance of the
proposed modified FrodoKEM scheme through the analysis of FrodoPKE′ without
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the description of the proposed KEM scheme for simplicity. The proposed modified
FrodoKEM is derived from FrodoPKE′ using QFO transformation, similar to that in
the previous study [1]. The description of the proposed KEM scheme can be omitted
for the following two reasons. First, the QFO transformation method described in [1]
can be used almost identically to construct the proposed modified KEM. In addition, it
is possible to analyze the performance of the proposed modified FrodoKEM according
to the change in parameters only by describing the FrodoPKE′.
Consider the IND-CCA security of the proposed modified KEM scheme. The IND-
CCA security proof of FrodoKEM shown in [1] is summarized as follows. They proved
that FrodoPKE achieves IND-CPA security and then proved that FrodoKEM modified
using QFO transformation achieves IND-CCA security. Similarly, if FrodoPKE′ is
proved to achieve IND-CPA security, then the proposed modified FrodoKEM can also
achieve IND-CCA security. The proposition that FrodoPKE′ has IND-CPA security
can be proved by the fact that FrodoPKE achieves IND-CPA security as follows.
(i) Suppose that there is an algorithm A that attacks FrodoPKE′. Let us design an
algorithm A′ that uses A to attack FrodoPKE.
(ii) A claims to be able to distinguish between ciphertexts of µ0 and µ1.
(iii) A′ puts the following values into FrodoPKE as inputs;
Frodo.Encode−1[Frodo.Encode′(BCH.Encode(µi))] for i = 0 and 1. A′
receives the ciphertexts ct0 and ct1. Then, ct0 and ct1 correspond to ciphertexts
of µ0 and µ1 in FrodoPKE′.
(iv) A′ passes the received ct0 and ct1 to A to distinguish.
(v) A distinguishes ct0 and ct1, and computes b ∈ {0, 1}.
(vi) A′ distinguishes the ciphertexts of the original messages µ0 and µ1 by outputting
b calculated by A.
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Since the proposed scheme simply adds BCH encoding and BCH decoding algo-
rithms to FrodoKEM, there is no danger of being particularly vulnerable to primal and
dual attacks, which are simply LWE attacks.
3.1.5 Evaluation of DFR
In FrodoKEM, 64 symbols in Zq are transmitted. Given the parameters n, q, σ, B, and
the maximum number of correctable bit errors t using an ECC (t = 0 if ECC is not
used), the DFR is computed through the following procedures:
(i) Find an optimal discrete noise distribution χ that approximates the rounded con-
tinuous Gaussian for a given σ. Find the optimal distribution considering attack
time for the LWE problem.
(ii) Obtain the product distribution ψ of two optimal distributions χ. Convolve ψ 2n
times and then convolve the resulting distribution with χ. Then, a distribution χ′
is obtained.





(iv) Compute the DFR of FrodoKEM using an ECC as follows. When an ECC with
the error correction capability t is used, Gray coding should be used. The 64
B-bit messages are encoded into 64 symbols in Zq, with the probability p that
an error occurs for each symbol. When Gray coding is used, most symbol errors
only generate one-bit errors. For example, Figure 3.4 shows that only a one-bit
error occurs when the decision boundary is crossed once. For various cases that
will be described in Section 3.2, Table 3.1 shows the comparison between the
probability of crossing the decision boundary once and that of crossing the deci-
sion boundary twice. The probability of crossing the decision boundary twice is
relatively negligible, as shown in Table 3.1, and in Case 5), it is too small; thus,
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the value cannot be obtained. The DFR is the probability that more than t sym-










Table 3.1: Comparison between the probability of crossing the decision boundary once
and that of crossing the decision boundary twice.
σ B
probability of crossing probability of crossing
decision boundary once decision boundary twice
Case 1) 3.38 3 2−20.42 2−72.73
Case 2) 2.87 4 2−10.72 2−36.73
Case 3) 2.84 4 2−26.06 2−94.52
Case 4) 1.93 3 2−155.62 2−528.52
Case 5) 1.78 3 2−203.53 ·
Case 6) 2.38 4 2−20.45 2−72.87
Case 7) 2.22 4 2−26.15 2−93.92
Case 8) 2.3 2 2−82.42 2−291.49
Case 9) 2.3 3 2−23.04 2−82.41
Case 10) 2.3 3 2−7.00 2−23.04
When using an ECC, if Gray coding is not used, the mapping in (2.2) for B = 3
and the following mapping for B = 4 can be used:
• B = 4 without Gray coding;
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Mappings in (2.1) and (2.2) are given in FrodoKEM. However, there is no bit-to-
symbol mapping for B = 4 in FrodoKEM; thus, the bit-to-symbol mapping in (3.5) is
given for B = 4 in the same way as the mappings in (2.1) and (2.2).
In this dissertation, the DFR of FrodoKEM using an ECC with and without Gray
coding is computed and compared. The following procedure depicts how to compute
the DFR of FrodoKEM using an ECC without Gray coding. Let p1, p2, p3, and p4 be
the probability values that the number of bit errors in one symbol in Zq after demod-
ulation is 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Let ni, i ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, be the number of symbols
in Zq such that the number of bit errors in a symbol is i. Suppose that the codeword
bits are uniform at random. Then, p1, p2, and p3 are approximately p/2, p/4, and p/4
when B = 3, respectively. In addition, p1, p2, p3, and p4 are approximately p/2, p/4,
p/8, and p/8 when B = 4, respectively. Then, the DFRs of FrodoKEM using ECCs


























Because it is very difficult to derive the DFR considering error dependency, the DFR
is usually computed assuming that errors are statistically independent. Recent stud-
ies have reported that the DFR was underestimated when using ECC [41] because
error dependency is not considered, and they proposed a DFR calculation method for
LAC considering error dependency. However, their DFR calculation method cannot be
applied to other schemes including FrodoKEM. The DFR is computed based on the
assumption that the error coefficients of S′E + E′′ −E′S in Algorithm 3 are indepen-
dent. Considering the DFR deviation due to the independence assumption, I try to set
a margin that is enough in the DFRs of the proposed improvements. The exact analysis
of DFR considering error dependency will be studied in future work.
3.2 Performance Improvement of FrodoKEM Using Gray
and BCH Codes
As ECCs, BCH codes are used to improve the security levels, increase the message
size, and reduce the bandwidth of Frodo-640 and Frodo-976.
3.2.1 Improving the Security Level of FrodoKEM
Because B should be increased to use ECCs, the DFR also increases. However, us-
ing BCH codes, the DFR can be effectively lowered, and thus the security level is
improved by maximizing σ while satisfying DFR < 2−148.8 for Frodo-640 and DFR
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Table 3.2: Cases for improving the security level of FrodoKEM scheme.
message
σ
security SER with DFR with SER without DFR without
size [bits] level [bits] Gray coding Gray coding Gray coding Gray coding
Frodo-640 128 2.75 149.30 2−154.82 2−148.82 · ·
Frodo-976 192 2.3 215.66 2−205.56 2−199.56 · ·
Case 1) 128 3.38 156.98 2−20.42 2−149.05 2−20.42 2−51.90
Case 2) 128 2.87 152.25 2−10.72 2−150.71 2−10.72 2−50.77
Case 3) 192 2.84 225.97 2−26.06 2−199.88 2−26.06 2−68.52
< 2−199.6 for Frodo-976. The parameters n, q, n̄, and m̄ are maintained, but only σ and
B are adjusted. Then, the security level can be improved while maintaining the band-
width and satisfying the DFR requirement. Table 3.2 summarizes the performances of
various cases with and without Gray coding to improve the security level as explained
below.
Case 1) Frodo-640 with (192, 128, 8) BCH code:
Encode the 128-bit message with (192, 128, 8) BCH code to obtain a 192-bit codeword
c. Modulates c using Gray coding in (3.1), and then, c passes through the channel. From
Table 3.2, B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 3
• σ; 2.75→ 3.38
• security level; 149.30→ 156.98
• SER = 2−20.42
• DFR = error probability after BCH decoding =
probability of more than 8 errors = 2−149.05.
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If the mapping in (2.2) instead of Gray coding in (3.1) is used, SER and DFR are
calculated as
• SER = 2−20.42
• DFR = 2−51.90.
From these results, it can be seen that the security level is increased by applying
the BCH code to Frodo-640. In addition, Gray coding is essential because when Gray
coding is not used, the DFR is much higher than the DFR when Gray coding is used.
Note that the security level can also be improved by simply increasing n without
using the BCH code. However, the bandwidth also increases as n increases. Table 3.3
compares Frodo-640 with (192, 128, 8) BCH code and Frodo-640 with increased n
while all parameters other than B and n (dimension of matrices) are unchanged. In
Frodo-640 with increased n, the security level is improved, but the bandwidth also
increases. Case 1) improves the security level while maintaining the bandwidth.





level [bits] size [bytes] size [bytes]
Frodo-640 with
149→ 157 2−149.05 9616 9736
(192, 128, 8) BCH code
Frodo-640
149→ 166 2−137.31 10516 10636
n : 640→ 700
Case 2) Frodo-640 with (256, 128, 18) BCH code:
Encode the 128-bit message with the (256, 128, 18) BCH code to obtain a 256-bit
codeword c. Modulate c using Gray coding in (3.2), and then, c passes through the
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channel. From Table 3.2, B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 4
• σ; 2.75→ 2.87
• security level; 149.30→ 152.25
• SER = 2−10.72
• DFR = error probability after BCH decoding =
probability of more than 18 errors = 2−150.71.
If the mapping in (3.5) instead of Gray coding in (3.2) is used, SER and DFR can
be calculated as
• SER = 2−10.72
• DFR = 2−50.77.
From these results, it can be seen that the security level is increased by applying
the BCH code to Frodo-640. However, the security level of Case 2) is less than the
security level of Case 1). In addition, Gray coding is essential similar to Case 1).
Case 3) Frodo-976 with (256, 192, 8) BCH code:
Encode the 192-bit message with the (256, 192, 8) BCH code to obtain a 256-bit
codeword c. Modulate c using Gray coding in (3.2), and then, c passes through the
channel. From Table 3.2, B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 3→ 4
• σ; 2.3→ 2.84
• security level; 215.66→225.97
• SER = 2−26.06
• DFR = error probability after BCH decoding =
probability of more than 8 errors = 2−199.88.
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If the mapping in (3.5) instead of Gray coding in (3.2) is used, SER and DFR are
calculated as
• SER = 2−26.06
• DFR = 2−68.52.
From these results, it can be seen that the security level is increased by applying the
BCH code to Frodo-976. In addition, Gray coding is essentially similar to the previous
cases.
3.2.2 Increasing the Message Size of Frodo-640
Table 3.4: Cases for increasing the message size of the FrodoKEM scheme.
message
σ
security SER with DFR with SER without DFR without
size [bits] level [bits] Gray coding Gray coding Gray coding Gray coding
Frodo-640 128 2.75 149.30 2−154.82 2−148.82 · ·
Frodo-976 192 2.3 215.66 2−205.56 2−199.56 · ·
Case 4) 192 1.93 137.18 2−155.62 2−149.62 · ·
Case 5) 192 1.78 134.52 2−207.62 2−201.62 · ·
Case 6) 192 2.38 144.27 2−20.45 2−149.35 2−20.45 2−51.68
Case 7) 192 2.22 141.91 2−26.15 2−200.70 2−26.15 2−68.79
In this section, the 192-bit message for Frodo-640 instead of the 128-bit message is
used because increasing the message bits from 128 bits to 192 bits has several advan-
tages. The 128-bit key for symmetric key encryption and 64-bit key for authentication
can be sent at the same time via the 192-bit key. In addition, if the 80-bit lightweight
cryptographic keys for IoT systems are used, two 80-bit keys can be sent at once.
In the following Cases 5) and 6), 256-bit codewords are mapped to the transmitted
47
matrix in Z8×8q , and thus, B is increased from 2 to 4. Because of the increase in B, the
DFR also increases, and σ should be decreased to satisfy the DFR requirement. Then,
the security level significantly decreases. However, it is possible to prevent degradation
of the security level by using BCH codes. Case 4) uses the 192-bit message without
using the BCH code. However, the security level significantly decreases. Cases 5) and
6) using BCH codes can satisfy DFR < 2−148.82 and DFR < 2−199.56, respectively.
Table 3.4 summarizes the performances of various cases with and without Gray coding
to increase the message as explained below.
Case 4) Frodo-640, Message; 128→192 bits, DFR < 2−148.82:
The 192-bit message µ is modulated using the mapping in (2.2), and then, it passes
through the channel. Then, from Table 3.4,B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 3
• σ; 2.3→ 1.93
• security level; 149.30→ 137.18
• SER = 2−155.62
• DFR = 2−149.62.
It can seen that increasing the message size decreases the security level signifi-
cantly.
Case 5) Frodo-640, Message; 128→192 bits, DFR < 2−199.56:
The 192-bit message µ is modulated using the mapping in (2.2), and then, it passes
through the channel. Then, from Table 3.4,B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 3
• σ; 2.3→ 1.78
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• security level; 149.30→ 134.52
• SER = 2−207.62
• DFR = 2−201.62.
It can be seen that increasing the message size decreases the security level signifi-
cantly.
Case 6) Frodo-640 with (256, 192, 8) BCH code, Message; 128 →192 bits, DFR
< 2−148.82:
Encode the 192-bit message with the (256, 192, 8) BCH code to obtain the 256-bit
codeword c. c is modulated using Gray coding in (3.2), and it passes through the chan-
nel. From Table 3.4, B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 4
• σ; 2.75→ 2.38
• security level; 149.30→ 144.27
• SER = 2−20.45
• DFR = error probability after BCH decoding =
probability of more than 8 errors = 2−149.35.
If the mapping in (3.5) instead of Gray coding in (3.2) is used, SER and DFR are
calculated as
• SER = 2−20.45
• DFR = 2−51.68.
Even though the BCH code is used, increasing the message size while maintaining
the DFR reduces the security level. However, in Case 6), the security level does not
deteriorate that much as compared to Case 4). In addition, it is clear that Gray coding
is essential.
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Case 7) Frodo-640 with (256, 192, 8) BCH code, Message; 128 →192 bits, DFR
< 2−199.56:
Encode the 192-bit message with the (256, 192, 8) BCH code to obtain the 256-bit
codeword c. c is modulated using Gray coding in (3.2), and then, it passes through the
channel. From Table 3.4, B, σ, and the security level are changed as;
• B; 2→ 4
• σ; 2.75→ 2.22
• security level; 149.30→ 141.91
• SER = 2−26.15
• DFR = error probability after BCH decoding =
probability of more than 8 errors = 2−200.70.
If the mapping in (3.5) instead of Gray coding in (3.2) is used, SER and DFR are
calculated as
• SER = 2−26.15
• DFR = 2−68.79.
Even though the BCH code is used, increasing the message size while satisfying
DFR < 2−199.56 reduces the security level. However, in Case 7), the security level
does not reduce much compared to Case 5). In addition, it is clear that Gray coding is
essential.
3.2.3 Reducing the Bandwidth of Frodo-640
The bandwidth of Frodo-640 can be reduced by reducing q. Then, σ should be reduced
to keep the DFR low because reducing q will increase the DFR. However, there are
limits to reducing σ. To meet the bounded distance decoding with the discrete Gaussian
sampling (BDDwDGS) reduction requirement, σ should be larger than 2.3 [1].
To reduce the bandwidth of Frodo-640, I can reduce q by half and improve the
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security level while satisfying the condition σ ≥ 2.3 using BCH codes, where the DFR
still meets the requirement. Table 3.5 summarizes the performances of the following
cases for reducing the bandwidth of FrodoKEM schemes.
Table 3.5: Cases for reducing the bandwidth of FrodoKEM scheme.
q B σ
public key ciphertext security DFR with DFR without
[bytes] [bytes] level [bits] Gray coding Gray coding
Frodo-640 32768 2 2.75 9616 9736 149.30 2−148.82 ·
Case 8) 16384 2 2.3 8976 9088 156.39 2−76.41 ·
Case 9) 16384 3 2.3 8976 9088 156.39 2−172.63 2−59.76
Case 10) 8192 3 2.3 8336 8440 172.33 2−28.84 2−10.98
Case 8) Frodo-640, q; 32768→ 16384, σ; 2.75→ 2.3:
I reduce q into half without using the BCH code and reduce σ as much as possible to
decrease the DFR such as σ = 2.3. Then, SER and DFR are calculated as
• SER is 2−82.42
• DFR is 2−76.41.
From these results, it can be seen that the DFR requirement cannot be satisfied by
simply reducing q without using the BCH code.
Case 9) Frodo-640 with (192, 128, 8) BCH code, q; 32768→ 16384, σ; 2.75→ 2.3:
In this case, q = 16384, σ = 2.3, B = 3, and the (192, 128, 8) BCH code are used.
The 128-bit message is encoded with the (192, 128, 8) BCH code to obtain the 192-bit
codeword c. Then, the codeword c is modulated using Gray coding in (3), and it passes
through the channel. Then, SER and DFR are calculated as
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• SER = 2−23.04
• DFR = 2−172.63.
In this case, the DFR is lower than the DFR requirement 2−148.82, and the band-
width of Frodo-640 can be decreased while satisfying the DFR requirement.
• public key; 9616 bytes→ 8976 bytes
• ciphertext; 9736 bytes→ 9088 bytes
At this point, the security level is improved as
• security level; 149.30→ 156.39.
If the mapping in (2.2) instead of Gray coding in (3.1) is used, SER and DFR are
calculated as
• SER = 2−23.04
• DFR = 2−59.76.
From these results, it can be seen that the security level can be improved and the
bandwidth can be reduced while satisfying the DFR requirement. In addition, it is clear
that Gray coding is essential.
Case 10) Frodo-640 with (192, 128, 8) BCH code, q; 32768→ 8192, σ; 2.75→ 2.3:
In this case, q = 8192, σ = 2.3, B = 3, and the (192, 128, 8) BCH code are used.
The 128-bit message is encoded with the (192, 128, 8) BCH code to obtain a 192-bit
codeword c. Then, the codeword c is modulated using Gray coding in (3.1), and it
passes through the channel. Then, SER and DFR are calculated as
• SER = 2−7.00
• DFR = 2−28.84.
In this case, the DFR is higher than the requirement 2−148.82. If the mapping in
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(2.2) instead of Gray coding in (3.1) is used, SER and DFR are calculated as
• SER = 2−7.00
• DFR = 2−10.98.
From these results, it can seen that if q is reduced to 8192, then the DFR require-
ment cannot be satisfied even if the BCH code is used.
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Chapter 4
Homomorphic Comparison Using Optimal Composi-
tion of Minimax Approximate Polynomials
4.1 Introduction
HE is a cryptographic algorithm that allows algebraic operations over the encrypted
data. Until Gentry’s seminal work [18] in 2009, HE schemes were able to perform only
a few specific operations for the encrypted data. FHE is a cryptographic algorithm that
allows all algebraic operations on the encrypted data without restriction and a FHE
scheme was first developed in [18]. Due to the feature, FHE has attracted significant
attention in various applications and the standardization process for FHE is in progress.
FHE schemes can be classified as bit-wise FHE and word-wise FHE. Word-
wise FHE such as Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) [20] and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song
(CKKS) [22] provides the addition and multiplication of an encrypted array over C
or Zp for a positive integer p > 2. All other operations in word-wise FHE should be
performed using these two basic operations. On the other hand, the basic operations
of bit-wise FHEs such as TFHE [21] are logic gates such as NAND gates. Recently,
word-wise FHE has been widely used in many applications such as deep learning
[42, 43].
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The comparison function is denoted as comp(a, b), which outputs 1 if a > b, 1/2
if a = b, and 0 if a < b. The comparison function is one of the most commonly
used operations along with addition and multiplication in many applications including
machine learning algorithms [44, 45]. However, when I encrypt inputs word-wise, it
is known to be difficult to perform the comparison operation for the ciphertexts in
FHEs, called a homomorphic comparison operation, since the comparison operation
is a non-polynomial operation. Thus, it is indispensable to find an efficient method to
implement the homomorphic comparison operation.
In this dissertation, a new efficient method to perform the homomorphic com-
parison operation in word-wise FHEs is proposed. Since comparison operation is a
non-polynomial operation, it is necessary to find and evaluate a polynomial that ap-
proximates comp(a, b). Comparison operations can be implemented by sign function,
that is, comp(a, b) = 12(sgn(a − b) + 1). Thus, in order to perform a homomorphic
comparison operation, it is enough to find a polynomial that well approximates sgn(x).
It is desirable to find the approximate polynomial that requires the minimum com-
putational complexity and depth consumption while satisfying a given approxima-
tion error bound. Addition, scalar multiplication, and non-scalar multiplication affect
the computational complexity. However, non-scalar multiplication requires the largest
computational complexity by far. Although the efficiency of FHE has been improved
a lot, non-scalar multiplication still requires a considerable amount of computational
complexity. Thus, a polynomial approximation of sgn(x), which minimizes the num-
ber of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption, is proposed in this disserta-
tion.
4.1.1 Previous Works
Some research has been done on how to find polynomials that approximate the sign
function sgn(x) or comp(a, b) in FHE. An analytic method to approximate the sign
function using the Fourier series was proposed in [46]. In [47], the sign function was
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large k > 0. Recently, an iterative algorithm was proposed that performs homomor-
phic comparison operation using the equation limk→∞ a
k
ak+bk
= comp(a, b) in [23],
where the inverse operation can be performed using Goldschmidt’s division algorithm
[48]. However, the use of inverse operation causes some inefficiency in computational
complexity. More recently, the homomorphic comparison operation is approximated
using composite polynomial with less non-scalar multiplications and depth consump-
tion than the previous methods in [24]. It was also shown that the homomorphic com-
parison operation by using composite polynomial has optimal asymptotic computa-
tional complexity. However, the performance of the homomorphic comparison opera-
tion using composite polynomials in [24] can be further improved since the composite
polynomials used in [24] do not guarantee optimality for the approximation of the
sign function by polynomials. Although there have been some improvements, the ho-
momorphic comparison operation still requires a lot of time, and thus more research
is needed to improve the performance of the homomorphic comparison operation for
practical use.
4.1.2 My Contributions
In this dissertation, I propose that if composite polynomials of component minimax
approximate polynomials obtained by the modified Remez algorithm [31] are used,
the efficiency of the homomorphic comparison operation can be further improved,
where I have three contributions as follows.
First, I propose a method of approximating the sign function with composite poly-
nomials of component minimax approximate polynomials. My main idea is to find
the composite polynomial which minimizes the non-scalar multiplications and depth
consumption among all of the composite polynomials of component minimax approx-
imate polynomials.
Second, since the sign function is an odd function, it is natural to use composite
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polynomials consisting of component polynomials with only odd degree terms. All the
component polynomials used in [24] are also polynomials with odd degree terms. It
is proved that the composite polynomials of component polynomials with odd degree
terms found by the proposed method is the best among all of the composite polyno-
mials of component polynomials with odd degree terms. That is, the composite poly-
nomial obtained by the proposed method requires less number of non-scalar multipli-
cations and depth consumption than any other composite polynomials of component
polynomials with odd degree terms.
Third, even though the optimal composite polynomials of component minimax
approximate polynomials can be found by the brute-force search from the candidate
composite polynomials of component minimax approximate polynomials, the brute-
force search requires an exponential time with respect to α, which corresponds to bit
precision. Thus, polynomial-time algorithms using dynamic programming which find
the optimal composite polynomials in polynomial time are proposed. By using the
dynamic programming, the number of required non-scalar multiplications and depth
consumption for evaluation of the proposed composite polynomials for the homomor-
phic comparison operation are obtained and compared to those for the previous method
[24]. It can be seen that for the case that I want to minimize the number of non-scalar
multiplications, the proposed algorithm reduces the required number of non-scalar
multiplications and depth consumption by about 33% and 35%, respectively, compared
to those for the previous algorithm. In addition, for the case that I want to minimize
the depth consumption, the proposed algorithm reduces the required number of non-
scalar multiplications and depth consumption by about 10% and 47%, respectively,
compared to those for the previous work.
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4.2 Approximation of Sign Function by Using Optimal
Composition of Minimax Approximate Polynomials
4.2.1 New Approximation Method for Sine Function Using Composition
of the Minimax Approximate Polynomials
In [24], the error of the approximate comparison polynomial compared to the
comp(a, b) is required to be bounded by 2−α for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] satisfying |a−b| ≥ ε.
Note that comp(a, b) = sgn(a−b)+12 . If a polynomial p(x) approximating sgn(x) is
(α − 1, ε)-close, then the error of p(a−b)+12 compared to comp(a, b) is bounded by
2−α for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] satisfying |a − b| ≥ ε. Thus, I find composite polynomials
approximating sgn(x) that satisfy (α − 1, ε)-close to compare the performance of the
proposed homomorphic comparison method fairly with that of the previous method in
[24].
In [24], sgn(x) was approximated by using a composite polynomial whose com-
ponent polynomial is fn on [−1, 1], which satisfies the following three properties:
(i) fn(−x) = −fn(x)
(ii) fn(1) = 1, fn(−1) = −1
(iii) f ′n(x) = c(1− x)n(1 + x)n for some constant c > 0.











If n and the number of compositions sn of fn become larger, the composite poly-
nomial f (sn)n approximates sgn(x) better. In [24], it is stated that they have the best
performance when n = 4. In addition, by defining and using the other polynomial gn
together with fn for composition, the efficiency of the composite polynomial is further
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improved with the smaller number of the required compositions. However, the poly-
nomial fn that satisfies the above three properties does not guarantee the optimality
for approximation using a composite polynomial. The other polynomial gn defined in
[24] has good properties, but it does not guarantee the optimality, too.
In this dissertation, I construct composite polynomials using new component poly-
nomials fi’s, which are different from those used in the previous paper [24] and the
repeated composition of each fi is not used, that is, si = 1 for all i. Let fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1
be a composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms ap-
proximating sgn(x) on [−1,−ε] ∪ [ε, 1]. Let [a0, b0] = [ε, 1], f1([a0, b0]) = [a1, b1],
f2([a1, b1]) = [a2, b2], · · · , fk([ak−1, bk−1]) = [ak, bk]. Note that fk ◦fk−1 ◦· · ·◦f1 is
(α−1, ε)-close if and only if fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1([ε, 1]) = [ak, bk] ⊆ [1−21−α, 1+21−α].
Since [ak, bk] should be a very small interval, it is desirable for each component poly-
nomial fi on the domain [ai−1, bi−1] to reduce the range as much as possible. My
key observation is that if the minimax approximate polynomials are used as compo-
nent polynomials, the size of the range [ai, bi] can be reduced quickly as i increases.
Thus, I use a composite polynomial of component minimax approximate polynomials
obtained by the modified Remez algorithm.
In this dissertation, the Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm [49] is used for evaluating
the approximate polynomials. Table 4.1 shows the required depth consumption and the
number of non-scalar multiplications for evaluating the approximate polynomials with
odd degree terms using the Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm. The exact required num-
ber of non-scalar multiplications and the depth consumption differ slightly depending
on how the original Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm [49] is modified. I refer to sev-
eral papers and find the minimum number of required non-scalar multiplications and
the depth consumption among them for each degree. I refer to the values in [24] for
polynomials of degree smaller than or equal to 15 and the values in [31] for polyno-
mials of degree larger than or equal to 17. The required depth consumption and the
number of non-scalar multiplications for evaluating a polynomial of degree d with odd
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degree terms by using the Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm are denoted by dep(d) and
mult(d).
The following definitions are necessary for description of Lemma 4.1.
Definition 4.1 ([24]). For α > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, a polynomial p(x) is said to be
(α, δ)-two-sided-close to sgn(x) if p satisfies the following:
||p(x)− sgn(x)||∞,[−1−δ,−1+δ]∪[1−δ,1+δ] ≤ 2−α,
where || · ||∞,D denotes the infinity norm over the domain D.
Definition 4.2. Let {fi}1≤i≤k be a set of polynomials satisfying deg(fi) = di, 1 ≤ i ≤
k. MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) denote the sum of the numbers of
non-scalar multiplications and the sum of depth consumptions required to evaluate fi









My goal is to find a (α−1, ε)-close composite polynomial fk ◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1 while
minimizing MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k). The following lemma
implies that finding a (α − 1, ε)-close composite polynomial fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is
equivalent to finding a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦
· · · ◦ f̃1 when δ = 1−ε1+ε .
Lemma 4.1. For a set of polynomials with odd degree terms {fi}1≤i≤k, let {f̃i}1≤i≤k
be a set of polynomials with odd degree terms such that f̃1(x) = f1(1+ε2 x) and f̃i(x) =
fi(x), 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is (α− 1, ε)-close if and only if f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦
· · · ◦ f̃1 is (α− 1, δ)-two-sided-close when δ = 1−ε1+ε .
Proof. Let fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1 be a (α−1, ε)-close composite polynomial of component
polynomials with odd degree terms. Since fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1(x) is a polynomial with
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Table 4.1: The required depth consumption and the number of non-scalar multiplica-





















odd degree terms, it is sufficient to consider only when x > 0. Then, fk ◦ fk−1 ◦
· · · ◦ f1(x) ∈ [1 − 2−(α−1), 1 + 2−(α−1)] for ε ≤ x ≤ 1. Let x′ = 21+εx. ε ≤ x ≤ 1
corresponds to 1−δ ≤ x′ ≤ 1+δ. Then, f̃k◦f̃k−1◦· · ·◦f̃1(x′) = fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1(x) ∈
[1−2−(α−1), 1+2−(α−1)] for 1−δ ≤ x′ ≤ 1+δ. Thus, f̃k◦ f̃k−1◦· · ·◦ f̃1 is (α−1, δ)-
two-sided-close. Conversely, let f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1(x′) ∈ [1− 2−(α−1), 1 + 2−(α−1)]
for 1− δ ≤ x′ ≤ 1 + δ. Let x = 1+ε2 x
′. 1− δ ≤ x′ ≤ 1 + δ corresponds to ε ≤ x ≤ 1.
Then, fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1(x) = f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1(x′) ∈ [1− 2−(α−1), 1 + 2−(α−1)]
for ε ≤ x ≤ 1, which means that fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is (α − 1, ε)-close. Thus, the
lemma is proved.
Note that since deg(fi) = deg(f̃i), 1 ≤ i ≤ k in Lemma 4.1, it holds that
MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) = MultNum({f̃i}1≤i≤k)
DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) = DepNum({f̃i}1≤i≤k).
Thus, for any m,n ∈ N, a composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd
degree terms fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1 is (α−1, ε)-close and satisfies MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) =
m and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) = n if and only if the corresponding compos-
ite polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 is (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close and satisfies
MultNum({f̃i}1≤i≤k) = m and DepNum({f̃i}1≤i≤k) = n when δ = 1−ε1+ε . Thus,
it can be seen that the following two algorithms are equivalent:
(i) An algorithm that finds the (α− 1, ε)-close composite polynomial fk ◦ · · · ◦ f1
which minimizes the number of non-scalar multiplications and the depth con-
sumption
(ii) An algorithm that finds the (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial
f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 which minimizes the number of non-scalar multiplications
and the depth consumption
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Thus, from now on, I focus on finding (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polyno-
mial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 which minimizes the number of non-scalar multiplications
and the depth consumption.
The minimax composite polynomial, which is the core of the proposed homomor-
phic comparison method, is now defined as follows. The main idea of the proposed
approximation method is to use the minimax composite polynomial to approximate
the sign function. I denote [−1− s,−1 + s] ∪ [1− s, 1 + s] by Rs for s > 0.
Definition 4.3. Let {fi}1≤i≤k be a set of polynomials. Let D be [−b,−a] ∪ [a, b].
fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is called a minimax composite polynomial on D if there exists
{di}1≤i≤k that satisfies the followings:
• f1 is the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most d1 on D for sgn(x)
and the minimax approximation error is equal to τ1.
• For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, fi is the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most di
on fi−1 ◦ fi−2 ◦ · · · ◦ f1(D) for sgn(x). The minimax approximation error is τi.
Note that fi ◦ fi−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1(D) = Rτi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k from Theorem 2.1. In fact, τi
becomes smaller as i increases. It can be seen that if fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is a minimax
composite polynomial onD = [−b,−a]∪[a, b], then {fi}1≤i≤k is a set of polynomials
with odd degree terms from Lemma 2.2. If τk ≤ 2−(α−1), then the minimax composite
polynomial onRδ becomes (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close. My key idea is to find the min-
imax composite polynomial on Rδ that requires the minimum number of non-scalar
multiplications and depth consumption among all (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax
composite polynomials onRδ. Note that there is a tradeoff between the number of non-
scalar multiplications and the depth consumption. I deal with both cases when putting
priority on minimizing the number of non-scalar multiplications and on minimizing
the depth consumption.
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4.2.2 Optimality of Approximation of the Sign Function by a Minimax
Composite Polynomial
Since sgn(x) is an odd function, it is natural to approximate sgn(x) by using a com-
posite polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms. Assume that I
can obtain the minimax composite polynomial on Rδ that requires the minimum num-
ber of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption among all minimax compos-
ite polynomials on Rδ satisfying (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close. In this subsection, it is
proved that the obtained minimax composite polynomial on Rδ requires less number
of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption than any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-
close composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms. That is,
for any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials
with odd degree terms, there exists a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite
polynomial on Rδ such that the number of required non-scalar multiplications and the
depth consumption for the minimax composite polynomial are less than or equal to
those for the composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms,
respectively.
The following definition and lemmas are needed for the proof of optimality of the
proposed approximation method of approximating the sign function using a minimax
composite polynomial.
Definition 4.4. Let {fi}1≤i≤k be a set of polynomials. fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is called a
1-centered range composite polynomial onRδ if {fi}1≤i≤k is a set of polynomials with
odd degree terms and there exists {τi}1≤i≤k such that f1([1−δ, 1+δ]) = [1−τ1, 1+τ1]
and fi([1− τi−1, 1 + τi−1]) = [1− τi, 1 + τi] for 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
Lemma 4.2. Let f1 be the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most d on
[−b1,−a1] ∪ [a1, b1] for sgn(x). Let f2 be the minimax approximate polynomial of
degree at most d on [−b2,−a2] ∪ [a2, b2] for sgn(x). If [a2, b2] ⊆ [a1, b1], then the
minimax approximation error e2 of f2 is less than or equal to the minimax approxima-
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tion error e1 of f1.
Proof. When f1 approximates sgn(x) on [−b1,−a1] ∪ [a1, b1], the maximum approxi-
mation error e1 is larger than or equal to the maximum approximation error e′1 when f1
approximates sgn(x) on [−b2,−a2]∪ [a2, b2]. According to the definition of minimax
approximate polynomial, f2 is the polynomial with the smallest maximum approxima-
tion error when approximating sgn(x) on [−b2,−a2]∪ [a2, b2] among all polynomials
of degree smaller than or equal to d. Among polynomials of degree smaller than or
equal to d, there is also f1. Thus, it holds that e2 ≤ e′1 ≤ e1, and the lemma is
proved.
Lemma 4.3. Let f̃k ◦ f̃k−1◦· · ·◦ f̃1 be any (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close 1-centered range
composite polynomial on Rδ. Then, there is a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax
composite polynomial f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ such that deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(f̃i) for i,
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. Since f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 is a 1-centered range composite polynomial on Rδ,
there exists {τi}1≤i≤k such that f̃1([1−δ, 1+δ]) = [1−τ1, 1+τ1] and f̃i([1−τi−1, 1+
τi−1) = [1−τi, 1+τi] for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, f̃k◦f̃k−1◦· · ·◦f̃1([1−δ, 1+δ]) = [1−
τk, 1+τk]. Since f̃k ◦ f̃k−1◦· · ·◦ f̃1 is (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close, τk ≤ 2−(α−1) should
hold. Let deg(f̃i) = di, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let f̂1 be the minimax approximate polynomial
of degree at most d1 on Rδ and let τ ′1 be the approximation error of f̂1. Then τ
′
1 ≤ τ1.
Let τ ′i be the approximation error of f̂i, which is the minimax approximate polynomial
of degree at most di on Rτ ′i−1 for sgn(x) for i, 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1
is a minimax composite polynomial on Rδ. I want to show that τ ′i ≤ τi, 2 ≤ i ≤ k
by inductive method. Assume that τ ′i−1 ≤ τi−1. Let τ ′′i be the approximation error of
the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most di on Rτi−1 for sgn(x). From
Lemma 4.2, it holds that τ ′i ≤ τ ′′i . Since f̃i([1 − τi−1, 1 + τi−1]) = [1 − τi, 1 + τi],
τ ′′i ≤ τi holds. Thus, τ ′i ≤ τ ′′i ≤ τi. It holds that τ ′i ≤ τi for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ k by
inductive method. Since τ ′k ≤ τk ≤ 2−(α−1), f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 is a (α − 1, δ)-two-
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sided-close minimax composite polynomial on Rδ such that deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(f̃i) for all
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Lemma 4.4. Let fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 be any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite
polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms. Then, there is a (α −
1, δ)-two-sided-close 1-centered range composite polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 on
Rδ such that deg(f̃i) = deg(fi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. Let f1([1−δ, 1+δ]) = [a1, b1], f2([a1, b1]) = [a2, b2], · · · , fk([ak−1, bk−1]) =
[ak, bk]. Since {fi}1≤i≤k is a set of polynomials with odd degree terms,
it holds that f1([−1 − δ,−1 + δ]) = [−b1,−a1], f2([−b1,−a1]) =
[−b2,−a2], · · · , fk([−bk−1,−ak−1]) = [−bk,−ak]. Satisfying (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-
close means that [ak, bk] ⊆ [1 − 2−(α−1), 1 + 2−(α−1)]. Also, it is easy to see
that 0 < ai < bi for i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k from the fact that fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 is






2 x), 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, f̃1([1− δ, 1 + δ]) = [1−
b1−a1
a1+b1
, 1 + b1−a1a1+b1 ]
and f̃i([1 − bi−1−ai−1ai−1+bi−1 , 1 +
bi−1−ai−1
ai−1+bi−1
]) = [1 − bi−aiai+bi , 1 +
bi−ai
ai+bi
], 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Then,
f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 is a 1-centered range composite polynomial on Rδ. I want to show
that [1 − bk−akak+bk , 1 +
bk−ak
ak+bk
] = [ 2akak+bk ,
2bk
ak+bk
] ⊆ [1 − 2−(α−1), 1 + 2−(α−1)], which
means that f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 is (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close. If ak + bk ≤ 2, then
1 − 2−(α−1) ≤ ak ≤ 2akak+bk and
2bk
ak+bk
= 2 − 2akak+bk ≤ 2 − ak ≤ 1 + 2
−(α−1)




= 2 − 2bkak+bk > 2 − bk ≥ 1 − 2
−(α−1) hold. Thus f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 is a
(α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close 1-centered range composite polynomial on Rδ satisfying
deg(f̃i) = deg(fi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The following procedure for proof of Theorem 4.1 is used:
(i) It is proved that for any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close 1-centered range composite
polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 on Rδ, it holds that deg(f̂i) = deg(f̃i) for all i,
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1 ≤ i ≤ k for some (α− 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial
f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ from Lemma 4.3.
(ii) It is proved that for any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial
of component polynomials with odd degree terms {fi}1≤i≤k, it holds that
deg(f̃i) ≤ deg(fi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k for some (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close
1-centered range composite polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̃1 on Rδ from Lemma
4.4.
(iii) Finally, with above lemmas, it is proved in Theorem 4.1 that for any (α− 1, δ)-
two-sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd de-
gree terms {fi}1≤i≤k, it holds that deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(fi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k for
some (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial f̂k◦ f̂k−1◦· · ·◦
f̂1 on Rδ.
Theorem 4.1. Let fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 be any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite
polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms. Then, there is a (α −
1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ such
that deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(fi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. Let fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1 be any (α−1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial of
component polynomials with odd degree terms. From Lemma 4.4, there is a (α−1, δ)-
two-sided-close 1-centered range composite polynomial f̃k ◦ f̃k−1◦· · ·◦ f̃1 onRδ such
that deg(f̃i) = deg(fi), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In addition, from Lemma 4.3, there is a (α−1, δ)-
two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ such that
deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(f̃i), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, there is a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax
composite polynomial f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ such that deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(fi) for all
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Remark 2. In Theorem 4.1, since deg(f̂i) ≤ deg(fi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds
that MultNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) and DepNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤
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DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k). It means that if I find the minimax composite polynomial on
Rδ that requires the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications and depth con-
sumption among all (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomials on
Rδ, the number of required non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption for the
obtained minimax composite polynomial on Rδ are less than or equal to those for any
(α− 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd
degree terms, respectively.
4.2.3 Achieving Polynomial-Time Algorithm for New Approximation
Method by Using Dynamic Programming
I can find the (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial on Rδ that
requires the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption
among all (α− 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomials by brute-force
search. However, the brute-force search requires considerable time. Thus, dynamic
programming is used to find the minimax composite polynomial on Rδ with the com-
putational complexity in polynomial time. Thus, I propose an algorithm to find the
minimax composite polynomial on Rδ that requires the minimum number of non-
scalar multiplications and depth consumption in polynomial time by using dynamic
programming.
MinErr(d, t), InvMinErr(d, t), f(m,n, t), and G(m,n, t) are defined before the
description of the proposed algorithms as follows.
Definition 4.5. For d ∈ N and t ∈ (0, 1), MinErr(d, t) is the minimax approximation
error of the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most d on Rt for sgn(x).
Lemma 4.5. For a fixed odd d ∈ N, MinErr(d, t) is a strictly increasing continuous
function of t on (0, 1).
Proof. Let d be 2i+ 1. Consider the minimax approximate polynomial p(x) of degree
at most 2i + 1 on Rt for sgn(x). Let τ0 be the minimax approximaton error of p(x)
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on Rt. Since sgn(x) is an odd function, it can be seen from Lemma 2.2 that the
minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most 2i + 1 to sgn(x) is equal to the
minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most 2i + 2 to sgn(x). Also, p(x) is a
polynomial with odd degree terms from Lemma 2.2. I want to show that there exist
i + 2 distinct points x0, x1, · · · , xi+1 ∈ [1 − t, 1 + t] that satisfy the following three
properties:
Prop 1. 1− t = x0 < x1 < · · · < xi+1 = 1 + t.
Prop 2. p(xj) = 1 + (−1)j+1τ0, 0 ≤ j ≤ i+ 1.
Prop 3. p(x) is strictly increasing on (0, x1). For j, 1 ≤ j ≤ i, p(x) is strictly
increasing on (xj , xj+1) when j is even, and strictly decreasing on (xj , xj+1) when j
is odd. Also, p(x) is strictly increasing on (xi,∞) if i is even and strictly decreasing
on (xi,∞) if i is odd.
|p(x)− sgn(x)| should have maximum values at 2i+ 4 distinct points in Rt from
Theorem 2.1. However, there are at most 2i distinct points x such that p′(x) = 0. If I
consider when x > 0, |p(x) − sgn(x)| should have maximum values at i + 2 distinct
points on [1 − t, 1 + t] and there are at most i distinct points x such that p′(x) = 0.
If |p(x) − sgn(x)| has maximum value at x = x0, then it holds that p′(x0) = 0 or
x = x0 is a boundary point, that is, x0 ∈ {1 − t, 1 + t}. Thus, |p(x) − sgn(x)|
should have maximum values at two boundary points x = 1 − t and x = 1 + t.
Let x0, · · · , xi+1 be the i + 2 distinct points on (0,∞) such that |p(x) − sgn(x)| has
maximum values at those points. Then, it holds that x0 = 1 − t, xi+1 = 1 + t and
p′(x1) = p
′(x2) = · · · , p′(xi) = 0. Also, considering p(0) = 0 and p(x1) > 0,
p(x) is strictly increasing on (0, x1). Since p(x0) < p(x1), it holds that p(x0) =
1 − τ0, p(x1) = 1 + τ0, p(x2) = 1 − τ0, · · · from Theorem 2.1. Also, it can be
seen that the Prop 3 is satisfied from Theorem 2.1. Thus, there exist i + 2 points
x0, x1, · · · , xi+1 ∈ (0,∞) that satisfy the above three properties. Now I want to show
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that MinErr(d, t) is a strictly increasing continuous function of t with domain (0, 1) as
follows:
(i) Strictly increasing:
Let 0 < t1 < t2 < 1. Let p1(x) and p2(x) be the minimax approximate poly-
nomials of degree at most 2i + 1 on Rt1 and Rt2 , respectively. It is trivial that
MinErr(d, t1) ≤ MinErr(d, t2). Assume that MinErr(d, t1) = MinErr(d, t2) =
τ0. Then, by the uniqueness property of the minimax approximate polynomial,
it should be hold that p1(x) = p2(x). Note that p1(x) is the minimax approx-
imate polynomial of degree at most 2i + 1 on Rt1 . Then, it can be seen that
0 < p1(1− t2) < p1(1− t1) = 1− τ0 from Prop 3. Considering p1(x) = p2(x),
the minimax approximation error of p2(x) on Rt2 is larger than τ0. That is,
MinErr(d, t1) < MinErr(d, t2), which is a contradiction. Thus, MinErr(d, t) is
a strictly increasing function of t.
(ii) Continuous:
I want to show that MinErr(d, t) is continuous at t = t0, that is, for any δ′ > 0,
there exists ε′ > 0 such that |t−t0| ≤ ε′ implies |MinErr(d, t)−MinErr(d, t0)| ≤
δ′. Let p(x) be the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most 2i + 1
on Rt0 , and let τ0 be the minimax approximation error of p(x). It is enough
to consider only the case when δ′ < τ0. There exist i + 2 distinct points
x0, x1, · · · , xi+1 ∈ (0,∞) that satisfy the above three properties. There exists a
unique x ∈ (0, x0) such that p(x) = 1 − τ0 − δ′. Let ε′1 be 1 − t0 − x for the
unique x. Also, there exists unique x ∈ (xi+1,∞) such that p(x) = 1 + τ0 + δ′
when i is even and unique x ∈ (xi+1,∞) such that p(x) = 1 − τ0 − δ′
when i is odd. Let ε′2 be x − 1 − t0 for the unique x. There exists unique
x ∈ (x0, x1) such that p(x) = 1 − τ0 + δ′. Let ε′3 be x − 1 + t0 for the
unique x. Also, there exists unique x ∈ (xi, xi+1) such that p(x) = 1 + τ0 − δ′
when i is even and unique x ∈ (xi, xi+1) such that p(x) = 1 − τ0 + δ′. Let
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ε′4 be −x + 1 + t0 for the unique x. Now, let ε′ be min(ε′1, ε′2, ε′3, ε′4). Then,
p([1− t0 − ε′, 1 + t0 + ε′]) ⊆ [1− τ0 − δ′, 1 + τ0 + δ′]. Thus, the minimax ap-
proximation error of the minimax approximate polynomial on Rt0+ε′ is smaller
than or equal to τ0 + δ′. That is, MinErr(d, t0 + ε′) ≤ τ0 + δ′. On the other hand,
let x′0 = x0 + ε
′, x′1 = x1, · · · , x′i = xi, x′i+1 = xi+1 − ε′. Consider 2i + 4
points −x′i+1,−x′i, · · · ,−x′0, x′0, · · · , x′i, x′i+1. From Lemma 2.1, the minimax
approximation error of the minimax approximate polynomial onRt0−ε′ is larger
than or equal to τ0−δ′. That is, MinErr(d, t0−ε′) ≥ τ0−δ′. Since MinErr(d, t) is
an increasing function, if |t− t0| ≤ ε′, then |MinErr(d, t)−MinErr(d, t0)| ≤ δ′.
Thus, MinErr(d, t) is continuous at t = t0.
If the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most d on Rt narrows the do-
mainRt to a rangeRτ , MinErr(d, t) outputs τ . Since MinErr(d, t) is strictly increasing
function of t on (0,∞), the inverse function of MinErr(d, t) exists, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 4.6. For d ∈ N, InvMinErr(d, t) is τ > 0 such that MinErr(d, τ) = t.
The approximate value of InvMinErr(d, t) can be obtained by binary search using
modified Remez algorithm.
Definition 4.7. f(m,n, t) is the maximum τ ∈ (0, 1) such that there exists a minimax
composite polynomial fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1 onRτ satisfying fk◦fk−1◦· · ·◦f1([1−τ, 1+
τ ]) ⊆ [1− t, 1 + t],MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) ≤ m, and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) ≤ n.
f(m,n, t) outputs the maximum τ > 0 when the range of a minimax compos-
ite polynomial on Rτ becomes smaller than Rt with m or less number of non-scalar
multiplications and with n or less depth consumption. The degrees of k component
polynomials for the corresponding minimax composite polynomial fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1
on Rτ in Definition 4.7 are stored in G(m,n, t) as an ordered set. It is trivial that if
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0 ≤ m ≤ 1 or 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, then f(m,n, t) = t. For m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, the following
theorem for f(m,n, t) holds:






InvMinErr(2k + 1, f(m−mult(2k + 1), n− dep(2k + 1), t)).





InvMinErr(2k + 1, f(m−mult(2k + 1), n− dep(2k + 1), t)).
Then there exists a minimax composite polynomial fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 satisfying
fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1([1 − τ, 1 + τ ]) ⊆ [1 − t, 1 + t],MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) ≤ m,
and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) ≤ n. Let d1 be the degree of f1 and let f1([1 − τ, 1 +
τ ]) = [1 − τ ′, 1 + τ ′]. Since the minimax composite polynomial fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f2
on [1 − τ ′, 1 + τ ′] satisfies fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f2([1 − τ ′, 1 + τ ′]) ⊆ [1 − t, 1 + t],
MultNum({fi}2≤i≤k) ≤ m−mult(d1), and DepNum({fi}2≤i≤k) ≤ n−dep(d1), it
holds that τ ′ ≤ f(m−mult(d1), n− dep(d1), t). Then,





InvMinErr(2k + 1, f(m−mult(2k + 1), n− dep(2k + 1), t))

















InvMinErr(2k + 1, f(m − mult(2k + 1), n − dep(2k + 1), t)) =
InvMinErr(2i + 1, f(m − mult(2i + 1), n − dep(2i + 1), t)) for some i. Let τ ′ be
InvMinErr(2i+1, f(m−mult(2i+1), n−dep(2i+1), t)). Let τ ′′ be f(m−mult(2i+
1), n− dep(2i+ 1), t) = MinErr(2i+ 1, τ ′). Then, there exists a minimax composite
polynomial fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f2 satisfying
fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f2([1− τ ′′, 1 + τ ′′]) ⊆ [1− t, 1 + t]
MultNum({fi}2≤i≤k) ≤ m−mult(2i+ 1)
DepNum({fi}2≤i≤k) ≤ n− dep(2i+ 1).
Let f1 be the minimax approximate polynomial of degree at most 2i + 1 on [1 −
InvMinErr(2i + 1, τ ′′), 1 + InvMinErr(2i + 1, τ ′′)]. Since f1([1 − InvMinErr(2i +
1, τ ′′), 1 + InvMinErr(2i+ 1, τ ′′)]) = [1− τ ′′, 1 + τ ′′], it holds that fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦
f1([1− InvMinErr(2i+ 1, τ ′′), 1 + InvMinErr(2i+ 1, τ ′′)]) ⊆ [1− t, 1 + t]. Also, it
holds that MultNum(fk ◦fk−1 ◦ · · ·◦f1) ≤ m and DepNum(fk ◦fk−1 ◦ · · ·◦f1) ≤ n.






InvMinErr(2k+1, f(m−mult(2k+1), n−dep(2k+1), t)) (4.1)
and the theorem is proved.
f(m,n, t) and G(m,n, t) are recursively computed by the following Algorithm 6.
In the 9th line of Algorithm 6, {2j + 1} ∪G(m−mult(2j + 1), n− dep(2j + 1), t)
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means inserting 2j + 1 to the ordered set G(m −mult(2j + 1), n − dep(2j + 1), t)
as the first component. In this dissertation, only minimax approximate polynomials of
degree at most 31 are used to reduce the time complexity of the proposed algorithms.
Since numerical results show that only minimax approximate polynomials of degree
at most 11 are used to minimize the number of non-scalar multiplications, it seems
that the minimax approximate polynomials of degree at most 31 are sufficient when
minimizing the number of non-scalar multiplications. On the other hand, minimax
approximate polynomials of large degree are sometimes used when minimizing the
depth consumption. Thus, if minimax approximate polynomials of degree larger than
31 are also used, the required depth consumption may be further reduced.
Now, DynMinMult and DynMinDep algorithms are introduced, which use the
values of f(m,n, t) and G(m,n, t) obtained from Algorithm 6. The following two
cases are considered, which correspond to DynMinMult and DynMinDep, respec-
tively.
First, DynMinMult puts more priority on minimizing the number of non-scalar
multiplications rather than minimizing the depth consumption. The minimum number
of non-scalar multiplications, Mmult is obtained. Mdep is the minimum required depth
consumption among minimax composite polynomials that have the minimum number
of non-scalar multiplications.
Second, DynMinDep puts more priority on minimizing the depth consumption
rather than minimizing the number of non-scalar multiplications. The minimum depth
consumption Ddep is obtained. Dmult is the minimum number of required non-scalar
multiplications among minimax composite polynomials that have the minimum depth
consumption.
mmax and nmax should be large enough to guarantee that the proposed algo-
rithms find the minimax composite polynomial on Rδ that requires the minimum
number of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption among all (α − 1, δ)-
two-sided-close minimax composite polynomials on Rδ. mmax and nmax should sat-
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Algorithm 6: Computation of f(m,n, t) andG(m,n, t) using dynamic pro-
gramming
Input: t,mmax, nmax
Output: f(m,n, t), G(m,n, t) for 0 ≤ m ≤ mmax and 0 ≤ n ≤ nmax
1 Generate 2-dimensional table G(m,n, t) for 0 ≤ m ≤ mmax and
0 ≤ n ≤ nmax, where the components are all empty sets.
2 for m← 0 to mmax do
3 for n← 0 to nmax do
4 if m ≤ 1 or n ≤ 1 then
5 f(m,n, t)← t
6 else




InvMinErr(2k + 1, f(m−mult(2k + 1), n−
dep(2k + 1), t))
8 f(m,n, t)←
InvMinErr(2j + 1, f(m−mult(2j + 1), n− dep(2j + 1), t))





isfy f(mmax, nmax, 21−α) ≥ δ and I set mmax and nmax heuristically. Note that
dep(d) ≤ mult(d) ≤ 2dep(d) for odd d less than or equal to 31. In [24], homo-
morphic comparison operations were proposed for cases when ε = 2−α and δ = 1−ε1+ε
and I can use the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications (or depth consump-
tion) values as in Table 4.2 to set mmax and nmax since I also propose homomorphic
comparison operations for the same case in this dissertation. Let q(α) be the mini-
mum number of non-scalar multiplications (or depth consumption) for the previous
algorithms. I set mmax = nmax = q(α) when minimizing the number of non-scalar
multiplications and set mmax = 2q(α), nmax = q(α) when minimizing the depth
consumption. Then, it holds that f(mmax, nmax, 21−α) ≥ δ.
Mdegs and Ddegs are ordered sets that store the degrees of the component mini-
max approximate polynomials of corresponding optimal composite polynomial when
minimizing the number of non-scalar multiplications and the depth consumption, re-
spectively. Values of Mmult,Mdep, and Mdegs can be obtained by using Algorithm 7.
Values of Dmult, Ddep, and Ddegs can be obtained by using Algorithm 8. The proce-
dure to find the optimal minimax composite polynomial using dynamic programming
is summarized as follows:
(i) f(m,n, t) and G(m,n, t) are computed recursively using dynamic program-
ming in Algorithm 6.
(ii) From the values of f(m,n, t) and G(m,n, t), find Mmult,Mdep, and Mdegs, or
Dmult, Ddep, and Ddegs in Algorithms 7 and 8, respectively.
(iii) Find the component minimax approximate polynomials fi’s using modified Re-
mez algorithm with Mdegs or Ddegs.
Theorem 4.3. LetMmult,Mdep, andMdegs be the output values of the DynMinMult
algorithm in Algorithm 7 for inputs α and δ. Then,Mmult ≤ MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) for
any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials with
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Algorithm 7: DynMinMult
Input: α, δ,mmax, nmax, f(m,n, 21−α), G(m,n, 21−α) for
0 ≤ m ≤ mmax, 0 ≤ n ≤ nmax
Output: Mmult, Mdep, Mdegs
1 for i← 0 to mmax do
2 if f(i, nmax, 21−α) ≥ δ then
3 Mmult ← i
4 Go to line 7
5 end
6 end
7 for j ← 0 to nmax do
8 if f(Mmult, j, 21−α) ≥ δ then
9 Mdep ← j
10 Go to line 13
11 end
12 end
13 Mdegs ← G(Mmult,Mdep, 21−α) // Mdegs: ordered set
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Algorithm 8: DynMinDep
Input: α, δ,mmax, nmax, f(m,n, 21−α), G(m,n, 21−α) for
0 ≤ m ≤ mmax, 0 ≤ n ≤ nmax
Output: Dmult, Ddep, Ddegs
1 for i← 0 to nmax do
2 if f(mmax, i, 21−α) ≥ δ then
3 Ddep ← i
4 Go to line 7
5 end
6 end
7 for j ← 0 to mmax do
8 if f(j,Ddep, 21−α) ≥ δ then
9 Dmult ← j
10 Go to line 13
11 end
12 end
13 Ddegs ← G(Dmult, Ddep, 21−α) // Ddegs: ordered set
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odd degree terms fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1. In addition, if Mmult = MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k),
then it holds that Mdep ≤ DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k).
Proof. Let fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 be any (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polyno-
mial of component polynomials with odd degree terms. Let MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) =
m and DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) = n. From Theorem 4.1, there is a (α − 1, δ)-
two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1 on Rδ such
that MultNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k) and DepNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤
DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k). Assume that m < Mmult. Then, MultNum({f̂i}) ≤
MultNum({fi}) = m < Mmult. Since m < Mmult holds and Mmult is the min-
imum i which satisfies f(i, nmax, 21−α) ≥ δ, it holds that f(m,nmax, 21−α) < δ.
Thus, there is no minimax composite polynomial f̄k ◦ f̄k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̄1 on Rδ such that
f̄k◦f̄k−1◦· · ·◦f̄1([1−δ, 1+δ]) ⊆ [1−21−α, 1+21−α], MultNum({f̄i}1≤i≤k) ≤ m, and
DepNum({f̄i}1≤i≤k) ≤ nmax. This leads to a contradiction since f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̂1
is a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial on Rδ such that
MultNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ m and DepNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ nmax.
In addition, assume that Mmult = m and n < Mdep. Then, f(m,n, 21−α) < δ.
Thus, there is no minimax composite polynomial f̄k ◦ f̄k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̄1 on Rδ such that
f̄k ◦ f̄k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f̄1([1−δ, 1+δ]) ⊆ [1−21−α, 1+21−α], MultNum({f̄i}1≤i≤k) ≤ m,
and DepNum({f̄i}1≤i≤k) ≤ n. This leads to a contradiction since f̂k ◦ f̂k−1 ◦ · · · ◦
f̂1 is a (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomial on Rδ such that
MultNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ m and DepNum({f̂i}1≤i≤k) ≤ n.
Theorem 4.4. Let Dmult, Ddep, and Ddegs be the output values of the DynMinDep
algorithm in Algorithm 8 for inputs α and δ. Then, Ddep ≤ DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k) any
(α− 1, δ)-two-sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd
degree terms fk ◦ fk−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1. In addition, if Ddep = DepNum({fi}1≤i≤k), then
it holds that Dmult ≤ MultNum({fi}1≤i≤k).
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Proof. The proof is omitted because the proof of Theorem 4.4 is almost the same as
that of Theroem 4.3.
The MinimaxComp algorithm that outputs an approximate value of comp(a, b)
is now proposed as in Algorithm 9, which uses the output Mdegs of DynMinMult or
the output Ddegs of DynMinDep algorithm. E(a, b; d) and F (a, b; d) are defined for
the description of the MinimaxComp algorithm as follows.
Definition 4.8. For a, b ∈ R and d ∈ N, let F (a, b; d) be the minimax approximate
polynomial of degree at most d on [−b,−a] ∪ [a, b] for sgn(x) and E(a, b; d) be the
minimax approximation error of the minimax approximate polynomial F (a, b; d).
Algorithm 9: MinimaxComp
Input: a, b ∈ (0, 1), α, ε
Output: An approximate value of comp(a, b)
1 {d1, d2, · · · , dk} ←Mdegs from DynMinMult or Ddegs from DynMinDep
for α and δ = 1−ε1+ε
2 f1 ← F (1− ε, 1; d1)
3 τ1 ← E(1− ε, 1; d1)
4 for i← 2 to k do
5 fi ← F (1− τi−1, 1 + τi−1; di)




In this section, the number of non-scalar multiplications and the depth consumption
of the proposed algorithms for the approximate polynomial for the sign function are
compared to those of the previous algorithm [24].
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4.3.1 Computation of the Required Non-Scalar Multiplications and
Depth Consumption
Let sf and sg be the numbers of compositions of fn and gn, respectively. NewCompG
algorithm in [24] approximates comp(a, b) using the composite polynomial f (sf )n ◦
g
(sg)
n with n = 4. According to Lemmas 1 and 3 in [24], if sg ≥ d 1log 0.98c2n · log(2/ε)e
and sf ≥ d 1log(n+1) · log(α − 2)e, then the approximation error of the output of
NewCompG(a, b;n, sf , sg) compared to the value of comp(a, b) is upper bounded by






The previous approximation method for the sign function in [24] has the best per-
formance for n = 4, where the degrees of the component approximate polynomials
fn and gn are 9, and both the required numbers of non-scalar multiplications and the
depth consumption for each component polynomial are 4. Then, it should hold that
sg ≥ d0.3894 log(2/ε)e and sf ≥ d0.4307 log(α− 2)e.
In this dissertation, the performances of the previous and proposed algorithms
are analyzed when ε = 2−α, which means that the input and output of the compar-
ison operation are required to have the same precision bits. Then both the total re-
quired numbers of non-scalar multiplications and the depth consumption are at least
4(d0.3894(α+ 1)e+ d0.4307 log(α− 2)e).
In the proposed method, the minimum number of required non-scalar multi-




Table 4.2: Comparison of the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications and the
corresponding depth consumption between the previous and the proposed algorithms
while minimizing the number of non-scalar multiplications.
number of non-scalar multiplications depth consumption
α the previous the proposed the previous the proposed
algorithm algorithm algorithm algorithm
5 16 8 16 8
6 16 11 16 10
7 24 12 24 12
8 24 14 24 14
9 24 16 24 15
10 28 18 28 16
11 28 19 28 19
12 32 20 32 20
13 32 22 32 22
14 32 24 32 23
15 36 25 36 25
16 36 27 36 26
17 40 28 40 28
18 40 30 40 29
19 40 31 40 31
20 44 33 44 32
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Table 4.3: Comparison of the minimum depth consumption and the corresponding
number of non-scalar multiplications between the previous and the proposed algo-
rithms while minimizing the depth consumption.
number of non-scalar multiplications depth consumption
α the previous the proposed the previous the proposed
algorithm algorithm algorithm algorithm
5 16 10 16 7
6 16 14 16 8
7 24 14 24 10
8 24 18 24 11
9 24 18 24 13
10 28 21 28 14
11 28 25 28 15
12 32 28 32 16
13 32 31 32 17
14 32 31 32 19
15 36 34 36 20
16 36 37 36 21
17 40 40 40 22
18 40 43 40 23
19 40 47 40 24
20 44 50 44 25
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Table 4.4: The ordered sets Mdegs and Ddegs that store the degrees of the optimal
component minimax approximate polynomials in DynMinMult and DynMinDep
algorithms, respectively.
α Mdegs Ddegs
5 {9, 9} {7, 13}
6 {5, 7, 9} {15, 15}
7 {9, 9, 9} {7, 7, 13}
8 {3, 9, 9, 9} {7, 15, 15}
9 {7, 9, 9, 9} {7, 7, 7, 13}
10 {3, 7, 7, 9, 9} {7, 7, 13, 15}
11 {5, 9, 9, 9, 9} {7, 7, 15, 31}
12 {9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {7, 15, 15, 31}
13 {3, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {15, 15, 15, 31}
14 {7, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {7, 7, 13, 15, 31}
15 {3, 5, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {13, 7, 15, 15, 31}
16 {5, 7, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {13, 15, 15, 15, 31}
17 {9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {13, 15, 15, 31, 31}
18 {7, 3, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {13, 15, 31, 31, 31}
19 {5, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9} {15, 31, 31, 31, 31}








































th no. of mults/depth of the previous algorithm
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depth of the proposed algorithm
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications and the
corresponding depth consumption between the previous and the proposed algorithms
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the minimum depth consumption and the corresponding
number of non-scalar multiplications between the previous and the proposed algo-
rithms while minimizing the depth consumption.
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Table 4.2 shows the comparison of the minimum number of non-scalar multipli-
cations and the corresponding depth consumption between the previous algorithm and
the proposed algorithm DynMinMult while minimizing the number of non-scalar
multiplications. It can be seen from Table 4.2 that the minimum number of the required
non-scalar multiplications and the corresponding depth consumption for the proposed
algorithms are reduced by about 33% and 35% on average, respectively, compared
to those of the previous algorithm. The proposed algorithm DynMinMult intends to
minimize the number of non-scalar multiplications, however, the corresponding depth
consumption is also decreased. Figure 4.1 describes Table 4.2 as a graph.
Table 4.3 shows the comparison of the minimum depth consumption and the cor-
responding number of non-scalar multiplications between the previous algorithm and
the proposed algorithm DynMinDep while minimizing the depth consumption. It can
be seen from Table 4.3 that the non-scalar multiplications and the corresponding depth
consumption for the proposed algorithms are reduced by about 10% and 47% on av-
erage, respectively, compared to those of the previous algorithm. If α ≥ 16, then the
number of non-scalar multiplications for the proposed algorithm is slightly larger than
that for the previous algorithm. However, when bootstrapping is used, the proposed
algorithm requires lower time complexity than the previous algorithm since bootstrap-
ping due to large depth consumption requires higher time complexity than non-scalar
multiplication operations. Figure 4.2 describes Table 4.3 as a graph.
Table 4.4 shows the ordered sets Mdegs and Ddegs that store the degrees of the
optimal component minimax approximate polynomials when minimizing the number




In this dissertation, modification of FrodoKEM using Gray and error-correcting codes
and optimal composition of approximate component polynomials with odd degree
terms for homomorphic comparison operation were proposed.
First, FrodoPKE is viewed as a digital communication system. BCH code param-
eters were designed for FrodoKEM and Gray coding is also used in FrodoKEM to de-
crease the DFR. It was proved that the modified FrodoKEM achieves IND-CCA secu-
rity and the performance of the modified FrodoKEM was analyzed. First, it was shown
that the security level of FrodoKEM can be increased for the modified FrodoKEM.
Second, it was found that the message size of Frodo-640 is increased. Finally, it was
shown that the bandwidth of Frodo-640 is reduced. I confirmed through numerical
analysis that the DFR is very high when Gray coding is not used.
Second, I proposed a new approximation method for the homomorphic compar-
ison operation using minimax composite polynomials obtained by the modified Re-
mez algorithm. My main idea is to find the minimax composite polynomial on Rδ
that requires the minimum number of non-scalar multiplications and depth consump-
tion among all (α − 1, δ)-two-sided-close minimax composite polynomials on Rδ.
It was proved that the obtained minimax composite polynomial on Rδ requires less
number of non-scalar multiplications and depth consumption than any (α− 1, δ)-two-
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sided-close composite polynomial of component polynomials with odd degree terms.
Since the brute-force search requires considerable time for α, I proposed polynomial-
time algorithms that obtain the best minimax composite polynomials by using dy-
namic programming. It can be seen from numerical analysis that when the number of
non-scalar multiplications is minimized, the minimum number of required non-scalar
multiplications and the corresponding depth consumption for the proposed algorithm
DynMinMult are reduced by about 33% and 35% on average, respectively, com-
pared to those for the previous algorithm. In addition, when the depth consumption is
minimized, the minimum number of required non-scalar multiplications and the cor-
responding depth consumption for the proposed algorithm DynMinDep are reduced
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(ii) 동형 비교 연산을 위해 합성 다항식을 사용한 부호 함수의 최적 미니맥스 다
항식근사
먼저,그레이부호및오류정정부호를사용하여 FrodoKEM을변형시키는방법
이 연구되었다. 격자기반암호는 가장 유망한 포스트 양자 암호 스킴이다. 많은 격
자기반암호시스템중에서 FrodoKEM은 learning with errors (LWE)문제에기반을
둔 잘 알려진 키-캡슐화 메커니즘 (KEM) 이며 구조를 갖지 않은 격자 문제에 기반
을 둔 어려움을 가진다는 장점이 있다. NIST 포스트 양자 암호 표준화 라운드 2에





FrodoKEM의 보안성 레벨 혹은 데이터전송량을 향상하고 기존 128비트보다 50%
많은 192비트가변형된 Frodo-640에서전송될수있음을보여주었다.
두 번째로, 합성 다항식을 사용한 부호 함수의 최적 미니맥스 다항식 근사가
연구되었다. 두 숫자의 비교 함수는 딥러닝 및 데이터 처리 시스템을 포함한 많은
응용에서 가장 많이 사용되는 연산 중 하나이다. 암호문 상에서의 덧셈과 곱셈만
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지원하는 동형 암호에서 비교 함수를 효율적으로 계산하는 몇몇 연구가 진행되었
다.동형암호에서합성다항식을사용하여부호함수를근사하는비교방법은동형




얻을 수 있다. 제안하는 알고리즘은 임의의 부호 함수를 근사하는 홀수 차수 항들













여호와는 나의 목자시니 내가 부족함이 없으리로다. 그가 나를 푸른 초장에
누이시며쉴만한물가으로인도하시는도다. (시 23:1-2)
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